Peace Never
By Bradley Burston, Haaretz, October 14, 2006
A little over 40 years ago, in another one-issue corner of the world, in another place that was too stiflingly hot, too historically traumatized, too politically paralytic to comfortably support human life, it was the question of racial segregation that occupied every cell of the resident subconscious.
So overwhelming was the issue, that protest signs and lapel buttons for opposing sides needed bear no more than a single word. For civil rights activists, Now was more than enough. For segregationists, it was Never.
If the past week is any indication, we here in the Holy Land can now make do with even less. At this point, a little under 40 years since the war many believed would be the Mideast conflict to end all Mideast conflicts, Never appears to be the only button left.
Unlike its well-established dovish counterpart, the Peace Never movement does not have mailing lists, officers and offices, a familiar logo, researchers, a website.
Nonetheless, Peace Never can boast wide support on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide.
Given the bleak diplomatic and security landscape, it is safe to say, and easy to comprehend, that sizable numbers of onetime believers in peace, among them adherents to Peace Now, have tacitly decamped to Peace Never.
For many, the allegiance to Peace Never is nothing new. For some, Jew and Arab alike, secular intellectuals, religious fundamentalists, white collar or blue, Diaspora or domestic, the ideology of Peace Never is a congenital given: There can never be peace between Jews and Arabs in historical Palestine, and thus there never will be.
For others, among them, politicians, settlement activists and real estate developers, Peace Never serves an additional, functional role. For them, Peace Never means no conceivable need for future concessions. Peace Never assures that life can go on as it is, forever.
In a wider sense, there has always been something about Peace Never that appeals to Israelis and Palestinians both. Something about Peace Never makes many on both sides feel righteous, empowered, it gives them a stronger sense of self, of belonging, of historic mission, of place. It is not only the primordial pleasure inherent in the understanding that Real Men Never Make Peace. After all, women are very well represented among the fanatics on both sides.
The appeal also comes from this firm belief: If our side says Never long enough, the other side will eventually cave, and our side will be the winner who takes all.
On the Palestinian side, the primary exponent of the Peace Never movement is currently Ismail Haniyeh. In a speech that saw him faint from the combined effects of a Ramadan fast and the Gaza City heat, Haniyeh felt it so crucial to stress that Hamas would not recognize Israel, that he said it three times in succession.
On the Israeli side, the sudden leader of Peace Never is none other than the Chameleon of Cremieux Street. It was only two months ago that Ehud Olmert predicted that Israel would leverage a victory in the Lebanon war into a further withdrawal from the West Bank. By this week, his transformation was such that the prime minister was talking partnership with Avigdor Lieberman, perhaps the standout segregationist of the Israeli far-right.
Does the popularity of Peace Never mean that there will never be peace? Ironically, no. Just listen to Hamas' purported chief rejectionist, Khaled Meshal, quoted this week as saying he could live with a Palestine along the pre-1967 war borders. Lieberman, also, has been expansive in drawing possible lines for separate states for Israel and Palestine.
In the interim, though, who can blame the convert to Peace Never? How much can you expect believers in peace to take?
Our militaries, Palestinian and Israeli, have beaten peace to a pulp. Year after year, we cluster bomb it from the air, suicide bomb it from buses, pick it off with sniper rifles, pulverize it with Qassam after Katyusha after Fajr after Zelzal. We settle it to death. We strangle it with walls, we crush it with bulldozers, we smother it by refusing to recognize the other side, talk to the other side, budge from our mental bunkers.
You can't blame many believers in peace for giving in and going to Peace Never.
How many years can you be expected to hold your breath, waiting for change, demonstrating for change, voting for change?
How many peace plans can you watch go unaddressed?
How many special envoys, Secretaries of State, Gulf state princes, can you watch leave with that same look on their face?
How much fury can you swallow?
How much disheartening can you stand?
How many generations have been raised hoping that the next will be the first not to go to war?
How many years can you hold your breath?
Saturday, October 14, 2006
Thursday, October 12, 2006
Small is beautiful - but who will listen?
A small Jerusalem is better
Haaretz, October 11, 2006
By Moshe Amirav
On October 17, the National Council for Planning and Construction is supposed to discuss a new plan that will change the face of Israel's capital. At issue is the construction of 20,000 residential units west of Jerusalem, which will dramatically change the direction of the city's expansion and will weaken it economically and politically.
The public uproar surrounding the new plan, which has led to the submission of 15,000 objections, stems from fear that the planning mistake of the 1970s is repeating itself. At that time, Israel invested huge sums in the construction of about 40,000 residential units in East Jerusalem. These turned into seven neighborhoods, including Ramot, Gilo and Pisgat Ze'ev, which today house about 180,000 Jewish residents.
The plan, which was initiated by Golda Meir's government in order to "strengthen the capital," was severely criticized by all the experts. Thirty years later, its destructive consequences have become evident: From a compact city of 37 square kilometers, Jerusalem has turned into a huge metropolis that covers 120 square kilometers, twice as large as the area of Tel Aviv and Haifa combined. Instead of channeling government investments into infrastructure, industry and tourism, they were channeled into the construction of these neighborhoods, which led to the flight of businessmen and the economic elites from the city.
During the past two decades, about 300,000 Jews have left the city, most from the middle or upper class. Jerusalem has turned into the poorest city in Israel, and today, Jewish neighborhoods comprise only one-third of the city's eastern part. The other two-thirds house about a quarter of a million Arabs, who have upended the demographic policy designed to reduce their proportions. The Jewish majority has shrunk to only 66 percent, and there is a fear that in another 20 years, the city will be binational - half its residents will be Palestinians.
The idea that a "bigger Jerusalem" would strengthen the city turned out to be mistaken. A "small Jerusalem" is preferable. Now, the National Council for Planning and Construction is about to repeat exactly the same mistake, but the consequences are liable to be far worse. A group of wealthy businessmen and a world-famous architect, Moshe Safdie, have joined forces to convince the municipality and the government that Jerusalem is not big enough, that it lacks built-up areas, and that 120,000 Jews must urgently be brought to it. Here lies the trap of the mistaken idea: There is no need to enlarge the city; just the opposite - it should be made smaller.
The solution is to strengthen the downtown area and invest in employment infrastructure, on one hand, and to relinquish the Arab neighborhoods, on the other. All the studies have proven that these two steps would strengthen the city economically and politically. They would raise the city's economic level from 90th (last) place, where it is now, to a respectable place in the top decile of Israeli cities. They would also increase the city's Jewish majority from 66 percent to 96 percent and ensure Jewish hegemony in the Israeli capital. But who listens to experts when wealthy businessmen promise the magic formula: the construction of 20,000 residential units on the slopes of the mountains west of the city?
The consequences of the Safdie plan, which calls for these thousands of new apartments, are liable to be a disaster for the capital. The plan would destroy the green landscape west of the city, while the economically strong population that the entrepreneurs promise to bring from the coastal plain to Jerusalem will not come. Tens of thousands of Jerusalemites will migrate from the city to private homes and cheap apartments in the luxury neighborhoods that will be built. The percentage of Jews in the city will decline to 50 percent within the coming decade, and Jerusalem will collapse economically and politically.
But now, just like 30 years ago, the experts' warnings will apparently be rejected under pressure of the entrepreneurs. Dozens of Knesset members from Labor, Yisrael Beiteinu, the National Religious Party and Meretz have signed a manifesto against the plan. But unless the interior minister and the prime minister intervene to stop the plan, or at least to downsize it, Jerusalem will continue on its planning march of folly, which holds that a "big Jerusalem" is the solution for strengthening the city.
The author served in the past as a member of the Jerusalem Municipality's administration
Haaretz, October 11, 2006
By Moshe Amirav
On October 17, the National Council for Planning and Construction is supposed to discuss a new plan that will change the face of Israel's capital. At issue is the construction of 20,000 residential units west of Jerusalem, which will dramatically change the direction of the city's expansion and will weaken it economically and politically.
The public uproar surrounding the new plan, which has led to the submission of 15,000 objections, stems from fear that the planning mistake of the 1970s is repeating itself. At that time, Israel invested huge sums in the construction of about 40,000 residential units in East Jerusalem. These turned into seven neighborhoods, including Ramot, Gilo and Pisgat Ze'ev, which today house about 180,000 Jewish residents.
The plan, which was initiated by Golda Meir's government in order to "strengthen the capital," was severely criticized by all the experts. Thirty years later, its destructive consequences have become evident: From a compact city of 37 square kilometers, Jerusalem has turned into a huge metropolis that covers 120 square kilometers, twice as large as the area of Tel Aviv and Haifa combined. Instead of channeling government investments into infrastructure, industry and tourism, they were channeled into the construction of these neighborhoods, which led to the flight of businessmen and the economic elites from the city.
During the past two decades, about 300,000 Jews have left the city, most from the middle or upper class. Jerusalem has turned into the poorest city in Israel, and today, Jewish neighborhoods comprise only one-third of the city's eastern part. The other two-thirds house about a quarter of a million Arabs, who have upended the demographic policy designed to reduce their proportions. The Jewish majority has shrunk to only 66 percent, and there is a fear that in another 20 years, the city will be binational - half its residents will be Palestinians.
The idea that a "bigger Jerusalem" would strengthen the city turned out to be mistaken. A "small Jerusalem" is preferable. Now, the National Council for Planning and Construction is about to repeat exactly the same mistake, but the consequences are liable to be far worse. A group of wealthy businessmen and a world-famous architect, Moshe Safdie, have joined forces to convince the municipality and the government that Jerusalem is not big enough, that it lacks built-up areas, and that 120,000 Jews must urgently be brought to it. Here lies the trap of the mistaken idea: There is no need to enlarge the city; just the opposite - it should be made smaller.
The solution is to strengthen the downtown area and invest in employment infrastructure, on one hand, and to relinquish the Arab neighborhoods, on the other. All the studies have proven that these two steps would strengthen the city economically and politically. They would raise the city's economic level from 90th (last) place, where it is now, to a respectable place in the top decile of Israeli cities. They would also increase the city's Jewish majority from 66 percent to 96 percent and ensure Jewish hegemony in the Israeli capital. But who listens to experts when wealthy businessmen promise the magic formula: the construction of 20,000 residential units on the slopes of the mountains west of the city?
The consequences of the Safdie plan, which calls for these thousands of new apartments, are liable to be a disaster for the capital. The plan would destroy the green landscape west of the city, while the economically strong population that the entrepreneurs promise to bring from the coastal plain to Jerusalem will not come. Tens of thousands of Jerusalemites will migrate from the city to private homes and cheap apartments in the luxury neighborhoods that will be built. The percentage of Jews in the city will decline to 50 percent within the coming decade, and Jerusalem will collapse economically and politically.
But now, just like 30 years ago, the experts' warnings will apparently be rejected under pressure of the entrepreneurs. Dozens of Knesset members from Labor, Yisrael Beiteinu, the National Religious Party and Meretz have signed a manifesto against the plan. But unless the interior minister and the prime minister intervene to stop the plan, or at least to downsize it, Jerusalem will continue on its planning march of folly, which holds that a "big Jerusalem" is the solution for strengthening the city.
The author served in the past as a member of the Jerusalem Municipality's administration
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Dr. Doolittle's legacy in Israel - wildlife university
Animals in captivity / Third in a series : A wildlife university - for study and protection
Haaretz, October 11, 2006
By Zafrir Rinat
It has no elephants or lions, and no cars lined up at its gates. Nonetheless, it is a zoo. Tel Aviv University's Garden for Zoological Research in Ramat Aviv is an important center for the preservation of Israeli wildlife.
The research area is closed to visitors. Here the Yarkon Acanthobrama fish live in special aquariums - this fish is not particularly impressive, but it is extremely rare, found nowhere except in several Israeli coastal streams.
When the Yarkon dried up in the drought a few years ago, the Acanthobrama faced total extinction, so a breeding nucleus was established at the zoo. Recently, attempts have begun to reintroduce the fish into the streams.
Among the Acanthobrama's neighbors are a pair of Lappet-faced Vultures who are among the last remaining in Israel. According to the zoo's academic director, Professor Arnon Lotem, the birds tried to nest but failed to breed.
The zoo also has a female White-tailed Eagle, who is the mother of many of the eagles reintroduced into nature in recent years to prevent the species' extinction.
University zoos are not found routinely anywhere in the world. As is often the case in Israel, this, too, was the initiative of a small number of individuals, particularly one of the university's founders, the late zoologist Heinrich Mendelssohn.
He saw to it that the zoo that operated even before the university's founding would accompany it, move to its present home in Ramat Aviv and receive the official name "Garden for Zoological Research."
Not open to the public
The zoo is not open to the public per se, but it annually hosts thousands of school children, and various professional groups hold seminars there.
All tours are guided and families can visit only by prior appointment.
The staff prepares the food for the animals and sells some of it to other zoos as a source of additional income.
"The main objectives of the garden are research, teaching and promoting conservation," Lotem says. "The animals have no names because the goal is primarily to observe them and not to bond with them - as caretakers do in ordinary zoos."
At the heart of the garden is a small green park, a congregation point for passing birds and for some of the zoo's animals. "This area allows for observing various types of animal conduct, so we placed cameras that broadcast directly to the Internet," Lotem explains. "There are also animals such as peacocks, which are simply a good model for understanding behavior."
In one corner of the park there is a group of endangered Hawaiian Nene geese. Several breeding nuclei were dispersed throughout the world, including Tel Aviv. One of the males in the group is taking no chances and exhibits intimidating behavior toward human visitors who approach the gaggle.
The zoo also attracts visiting animals from the area. Mongooses drop by regularly and recently six vipers showed up. Permanent tenants include such denizens of urban nature as the fruit bat, which is revealed upon close observation to be friendly and nothing like its superstitious reputation.
Haaretz, October 11, 2006
By Zafrir Rinat
It has no elephants or lions, and no cars lined up at its gates. Nonetheless, it is a zoo. Tel Aviv University's Garden for Zoological Research in Ramat Aviv is an important center for the preservation of Israeli wildlife.
The research area is closed to visitors. Here the Yarkon Acanthobrama fish live in special aquariums - this fish is not particularly impressive, but it is extremely rare, found nowhere except in several Israeli coastal streams.
When the Yarkon dried up in the drought a few years ago, the Acanthobrama faced total extinction, so a breeding nucleus was established at the zoo. Recently, attempts have begun to reintroduce the fish into the streams.
Among the Acanthobrama's neighbors are a pair of Lappet-faced Vultures who are among the last remaining in Israel. According to the zoo's academic director, Professor Arnon Lotem, the birds tried to nest but failed to breed.
The zoo also has a female White-tailed Eagle, who is the mother of many of the eagles reintroduced into nature in recent years to prevent the species' extinction.
University zoos are not found routinely anywhere in the world. As is often the case in Israel, this, too, was the initiative of a small number of individuals, particularly one of the university's founders, the late zoologist Heinrich Mendelssohn.
He saw to it that the zoo that operated even before the university's founding would accompany it, move to its present home in Ramat Aviv and receive the official name "Garden for Zoological Research."
Not open to the public
The zoo is not open to the public per se, but it annually hosts thousands of school children, and various professional groups hold seminars there.
All tours are guided and families can visit only by prior appointment.
The staff prepares the food for the animals and sells some of it to other zoos as a source of additional income.
"The main objectives of the garden are research, teaching and promoting conservation," Lotem says. "The animals have no names because the goal is primarily to observe them and not to bond with them - as caretakers do in ordinary zoos."
At the heart of the garden is a small green park, a congregation point for passing birds and for some of the zoo's animals. "This area allows for observing various types of animal conduct, so we placed cameras that broadcast directly to the Internet," Lotem explains. "There are also animals such as peacocks, which are simply a good model for understanding behavior."
In one corner of the park there is a group of endangered Hawaiian Nene geese. Several breeding nuclei were dispersed throughout the world, including Tel Aviv. One of the males in the group is taking no chances and exhibits intimidating behavior toward human visitors who approach the gaggle.
The zoo also attracts visiting animals from the area. Mongooses drop by regularly and recently six vipers showed up. Permanent tenants include such denizens of urban nature as the fruit bat, which is revealed upon close observation to be friendly and nothing like its superstitious reputation.
Tuesday, October 10, 2006
Personal responsibility (not...)
Yes, heads must roll
Haaretz, October 10, 2006
By Moshe Negbi
It is not only the reserve soldiers who have difficulty considering the Winograd committee to be a reliable substitute for a state commission of inquiry. The judges sitting on the High Court of Justice have also showed their displeasure with the situation in which a person who is to be investigated appoints his own investigators. Justice Ayala Procaccia expressed doubts about whether a committee of inquiry could examine "so large a failure of the mechanism, such a colossal event," when the central object under investigation is the government that appointed the committee.
This criticism from the High Court is not surprising. Last month, Supreme Court justices bid farewell to Aharon Barak and swore allegiance to his heritage. A central element in this heritage was the determination to ensure that responsibility is taken by senior officials who have transgressed. This was reflected in the so-called Buzaglo test: as when Barak was attorney-general, and he insisted on bringing such senior people to trial even if this would lead to their being deposed; in his series of rulings as a justice, when he stated that such officials had to leave office if they were no longer able to show "honesty and integrity"; and when he stated, in the state commission of inquiry following the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, that public office-holders should be removed if they have failed in their judgment.
Barak didn't accept the claim that he lacked the right to make politicians' heads roll because that was the prerogative solely of the voters. "The judgment of the public," he declared, "is not a substitute for public law." But the political establishment ignores this ethical heritage. President Moshe Katsav has lost his ability to project honesty and integrity, but neither he nor the Knesset is taking the matter to its logical conclusion. And this, of course, is true also for the behavior of those who led us in the second Lebanon war.
Ehud Olmert's refusal to have a state commission of inquiry seems to be like a targeted assassination of the possibility that justices will serve on its panel of the caliber of Barak, Mishael Cheshin and Dorit Beinisch - who have proved that they are not afraid of demanding that responsibility be taken by senior officials. But this time it is clear that an existential price might have to be paid for trying to evade responsibility, and that taking responsibility is vital not only so that those responsible can be "punished," but also to prevent them from continuing to perpetrate further disaster.
This time, we are not merely witness to an unusually crude form of lack of accountability but, for the first time, a cynical attempt has been made to turn this weakness into an "ideology." We are told that indeed lessons must be learned, but there is no possibility of allowing "heads to roll" because this would prevent necessary rehabilitation. But is it indeed at all possible to learn lessons, and is there any chance of rehabilitation, if heads do not roll and if the option of failing once again is not ruled out?
And this brings us back to the Barak legacy. In the report by the state commission of inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Barak explained that the political and military echelons must not be freed of having to "face up to public scrutiny of deeds and omissions that indicate a lack of efficacy ... or lack of appropriate attention ... or deeds that were done in haste, with negligence, with lack of wisdom and without trying to foresee their future effect."
How can personal responsibility be imposed? It is best, of course, for the person who has failed to resign. If he does not do so, the public should demand that of him. But the public's awareness of the necessity for taking personal responsibility has also been eroded. We could have realized this even before the disappointing appearances at the protest encampments of the Movement for Quality Government and the reservists. The fact that Ariel Sharon had been condemned by a state commission of inquiry for his failure during the first Lebanon war, and even the strengthening of the claim that Sharon had misled Menachem Begin, on the part of the courts, did not prevent the public from electing him prime minister twice.
If one cannot rely either on the leaders themselves or on the public, then there is no other recourse than a state commission of inquiry that will force personal responsibility to be taken. There are indeed those who feel that the remedy lies in educating the leaders and the public about taking personal responsibility. The problem is that education is a long, drawn-out process and we cannot permit ourselves to put our fates in the hands of faltering stewards until such a process is completed.
In addition, there is not necessarily a contradiction between educating people to take personal responsibility and imposing this responsibility through a state commission. On the contrary: Only persistent efforts to force people to take personal responsibility by a legal body will make it possible to grasp that it is insufferable that in a well-ordered democracy, those responsible for fatal failures continue to serve as our leaders, and that we have an inherent need to free ourselves of them.
The writer is the legal commentator of Israel Radio and a senior lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Haaretz, October 10, 2006
By Moshe Negbi
It is not only the reserve soldiers who have difficulty considering the Winograd committee to be a reliable substitute for a state commission of inquiry. The judges sitting on the High Court of Justice have also showed their displeasure with the situation in which a person who is to be investigated appoints his own investigators. Justice Ayala Procaccia expressed doubts about whether a committee of inquiry could examine "so large a failure of the mechanism, such a colossal event," when the central object under investigation is the government that appointed the committee.
This criticism from the High Court is not surprising. Last month, Supreme Court justices bid farewell to Aharon Barak and swore allegiance to his heritage. A central element in this heritage was the determination to ensure that responsibility is taken by senior officials who have transgressed. This was reflected in the so-called Buzaglo test: as when Barak was attorney-general, and he insisted on bringing such senior people to trial even if this would lead to their being deposed; in his series of rulings as a justice, when he stated that such officials had to leave office if they were no longer able to show "honesty and integrity"; and when he stated, in the state commission of inquiry following the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, that public office-holders should be removed if they have failed in their judgment.
Barak didn't accept the claim that he lacked the right to make politicians' heads roll because that was the prerogative solely of the voters. "The judgment of the public," he declared, "is not a substitute for public law." But the political establishment ignores this ethical heritage. President Moshe Katsav has lost his ability to project honesty and integrity, but neither he nor the Knesset is taking the matter to its logical conclusion. And this, of course, is true also for the behavior of those who led us in the second Lebanon war.
Ehud Olmert's refusal to have a state commission of inquiry seems to be like a targeted assassination of the possibility that justices will serve on its panel of the caliber of Barak, Mishael Cheshin and Dorit Beinisch - who have proved that they are not afraid of demanding that responsibility be taken by senior officials. But this time it is clear that an existential price might have to be paid for trying to evade responsibility, and that taking responsibility is vital not only so that those responsible can be "punished," but also to prevent them from continuing to perpetrate further disaster.
This time, we are not merely witness to an unusually crude form of lack of accountability but, for the first time, a cynical attempt has been made to turn this weakness into an "ideology." We are told that indeed lessons must be learned, but there is no possibility of allowing "heads to roll" because this would prevent necessary rehabilitation. But is it indeed at all possible to learn lessons, and is there any chance of rehabilitation, if heads do not roll and if the option of failing once again is not ruled out?
And this brings us back to the Barak legacy. In the report by the state commission of inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Barak explained that the political and military echelons must not be freed of having to "face up to public scrutiny of deeds and omissions that indicate a lack of efficacy ... or lack of appropriate attention ... or deeds that were done in haste, with negligence, with lack of wisdom and without trying to foresee their future effect."
How can personal responsibility be imposed? It is best, of course, for the person who has failed to resign. If he does not do so, the public should demand that of him. But the public's awareness of the necessity for taking personal responsibility has also been eroded. We could have realized this even before the disappointing appearances at the protest encampments of the Movement for Quality Government and the reservists. The fact that Ariel Sharon had been condemned by a state commission of inquiry for his failure during the first Lebanon war, and even the strengthening of the claim that Sharon had misled Menachem Begin, on the part of the courts, did not prevent the public from electing him prime minister twice.
If one cannot rely either on the leaders themselves or on the public, then there is no other recourse than a state commission of inquiry that will force personal responsibility to be taken. There are indeed those who feel that the remedy lies in educating the leaders and the public about taking personal responsibility. The problem is that education is a long, drawn-out process and we cannot permit ourselves to put our fates in the hands of faltering stewards until such a process is completed.
In addition, there is not necessarily a contradiction between educating people to take personal responsibility and imposing this responsibility through a state commission. On the contrary: Only persistent efforts to force people to take personal responsibility by a legal body will make it possible to grasp that it is insufferable that in a well-ordered democracy, those responsible for fatal failures continue to serve as our leaders, and that we have an inherent need to free ourselves of them.
The writer is the legal commentator of Israel Radio and a senior lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Monday, October 09, 2006
Israel's culture of government
A crooked line between two points
By Uzi Benziman, Haaretz, October 9, 2006
Tzachi Hanegbi called on no less than Benjamin Ben-Eliezer in an interview in last week's Haaretz Magazine: Ben-Eliezer, he said, told him that if the authorities were to pick on him, Ben-Eliezer, or on Sharon, the way they are picking on Hanegbi over alleged political appointments, they would have to execute them and not just try them. That is Hanegbi's defense - everybody did it, even if there is a normative defect in his actions [RM: even if what he did was wrong]. As evidence he does not bring up public figures like Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, Haim Oron or Yossi Sarid, but Ben-Eliezer. Not for nothing did the swallow go to the crow [RM: birds of a feather flock together]
Hanegbi's remarks are enlightening not only in themselves but because of the direct, albeit crooked, line between his moral world and attitude to public life as he reveals them in the interview, and those of Ehud Olmert and the members of his cabinet. The Hanegbi that floats between the lines recorded by Gidi Weitz is a person who says it is his right, in the area of political appointments, to do anything he wants in the ministries entrusted to him. He is a public figure who claims that he was not elected to his position to be the civil service commissioner and therefore he is exempt from ethical and moral considerations and the rules of proper administration. He is a politician who justifies hiring those he wants to reward with senior positions in the civil service, even if they come with a proven can of worms, including criminal convictions. He is a minister and MK who claims that it is his right to ignore High Court rulings when they contradict his political needs.
The court will decide Hanegbi's case and will clarify among other things the veracity of the facts he shared with Haaretz readers, including his claim that then-state comptroller Eliezer Goldberg ostensibly had a personal motive for criticizing the system of political appointments in the Environment Ministry during Hanegbi's tenure. The mood in the interview reflects Olmert's attitude (and that of most of his ministers) to the demand to place the investigation of the war in Lebanon in the hands of a state commission of inquiry.
Like Hanegbi, Olmert also claims that proper public norms are not what will dictate his behavior, but rather his arbitrary will. Like Hanegbi, Olmert also relates to the authority with which the state has entrusted him as his own private property with which he can do as he pleases. Like Hanegbi, Olmert also ignores precedents and accepted procedures in similar cases, in order to avoid an appointment that will let control over the composition of a committee or its work slip out of his hands. Like Hanegbi Olmert, too, prefers that the issues involving his conduct be examined by people he appoints, and not by an external state body.
Nothing in this analysis should cast any aspersions on the members of the Winograd committee. Its purpose is to highlight the cynical and arrogant culture of governing to which Hanegbi and Olmert are party.
To escape a credible external examination of his conduct and the functioning of the bodies under his authority during the Lebanon war, Olmert became entangled in a frenzy of actions, motivating the High Court to demand that within five days he explain why a state committee of inquiry should not be established. It is too soon to know how the justices will rule, but it is enough to look back at the leap-frogging decisions the prime minister made in this matter to be filled with shame and concern over the way the state investigates its failures in areas of prime importance. Readers of the Hanegbi interview can crack the code of Olmert's behavior: L'État, c'est moi.
By Uzi Benziman, Haaretz, October 9, 2006
Tzachi Hanegbi called on no less than Benjamin Ben-Eliezer in an interview in last week's Haaretz Magazine: Ben-Eliezer, he said, told him that if the authorities were to pick on him, Ben-Eliezer, or on Sharon, the way they are picking on Hanegbi over alleged political appointments, they would have to execute them and not just try them. That is Hanegbi's defense - everybody did it, even if there is a normative defect in his actions [RM: even if what he did was wrong]. As evidence he does not bring up public figures like Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, Haim Oron or Yossi Sarid, but Ben-Eliezer. Not for nothing did the swallow go to the crow [RM: birds of a feather flock together]
Hanegbi's remarks are enlightening not only in themselves but because of the direct, albeit crooked, line between his moral world and attitude to public life as he reveals them in the interview, and those of Ehud Olmert and the members of his cabinet. The Hanegbi that floats between the lines recorded by Gidi Weitz is a person who says it is his right, in the area of political appointments, to do anything he wants in the ministries entrusted to him. He is a public figure who claims that he was not elected to his position to be the civil service commissioner and therefore he is exempt from ethical and moral considerations and the rules of proper administration. He is a politician who justifies hiring those he wants to reward with senior positions in the civil service, even if they come with a proven can of worms, including criminal convictions. He is a minister and MK who claims that it is his right to ignore High Court rulings when they contradict his political needs.
The court will decide Hanegbi's case and will clarify among other things the veracity of the facts he shared with Haaretz readers, including his claim that then-state comptroller Eliezer Goldberg ostensibly had a personal motive for criticizing the system of political appointments in the Environment Ministry during Hanegbi's tenure. The mood in the interview reflects Olmert's attitude (and that of most of his ministers) to the demand to place the investigation of the war in Lebanon in the hands of a state commission of inquiry.
Like Hanegbi, Olmert also claims that proper public norms are not what will dictate his behavior, but rather his arbitrary will. Like Hanegbi, Olmert also relates to the authority with which the state has entrusted him as his own private property with which he can do as he pleases. Like Hanegbi, Olmert also ignores precedents and accepted procedures in similar cases, in order to avoid an appointment that will let control over the composition of a committee or its work slip out of his hands. Like Hanegbi Olmert, too, prefers that the issues involving his conduct be examined by people he appoints, and not by an external state body.
Nothing in this analysis should cast any aspersions on the members of the Winograd committee. Its purpose is to highlight the cynical and arrogant culture of governing to which Hanegbi and Olmert are party.
To escape a credible external examination of his conduct and the functioning of the bodies under his authority during the Lebanon war, Olmert became entangled in a frenzy of actions, motivating the High Court to demand that within five days he explain why a state committee of inquiry should not be established. It is too soon to know how the justices will rule, but it is enough to look back at the leap-frogging decisions the prime minister made in this matter to be filled with shame and concern over the way the state investigates its failures in areas of prime importance. Readers of the Hanegbi interview can crack the code of Olmert's behavior: L'État, c'est moi.
Sunday, October 08, 2006
Medical interpreter training - Israel
Accurate translation can be a matter of life and death
By JUDY SIEGEL-ITZKOVICH
Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2006
The first-ever course in medical interpreting took place just before Rosh Hashana, and the 18 graduates will serve as telephone interpreters between Hebrew and Amharic, taking calls from physicians and other healthcare professionals throughout the country. All participants in the recent course are originally from Ethiopia and trained as healthcare professionals, mostly registered nurses. The program was the result of a successful collaboration of the Tene Briut project at Hillel Yaffe Medical Center in Hadera and Bar Ilan University's department of translation and interpreting studies.
Open communication, free of language gaps, has been shown to be essential to the delivery of healthcare. A recent study of Ethiopian immigrants showed significant gaps in the extent to which they make effective use of medical services compared to the rest of the population. The study pointed to a clear need for better communication and overcoming misunderstandings stemming from cultural differences.
One of the responses to these unsettling findings was the decision to launch a program designed to train professional interpreters. The course consisted of lectures on linguistic and cultural issues, professional ethics, the challenge of remote interpreting, as well as a review of medical terminology in the two languages. The main part of the course, however, comprised open discussions concerning the role of the interpreter (whether as a "transparent tube," culture broker, language mediator, patient advocate or ad hoc social worker). Each of the participants also took part in simulated sessions, playing an interpreter between an Amharic-speaking patient and a Hebrew-speaking physician. The simulations, which were filmed in a real health fund clinic, were then analyzed to evaluate the interpreters' performance and effectiveness.
The program was initiated by Dr. Anat Jaffe, chief of the endocrinology department at the Hadera hospital, and Prof. Miriam Shlesinger, head of the BIU translation studies department. They worked with Tene Briut coordinator Pekkado (Yossi) Gadamo; epidemiologist Dr. Eltchee Seffefe; linguist Dr. Embesse Tabbere and Michal Schuster, a BIU doctoral student whose work centers on intercultural issues in healthcare delivery. They are hoping to launch the service soon, once the technical arrangements have been completed and funding has been secured.
As for the recent graduates, who are all too familiar with the hardships encountered by non-Hebrew-speaking immigrants, they too are eager to begin placing the members of their community on an equal footing in accessing medical care.
By JUDY SIEGEL-ITZKOVICH
Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2006
The first-ever course in medical interpreting took place just before Rosh Hashana, and the 18 graduates will serve as telephone interpreters between Hebrew and Amharic, taking calls from physicians and other healthcare professionals throughout the country. All participants in the recent course are originally from Ethiopia and trained as healthcare professionals, mostly registered nurses. The program was the result of a successful collaboration of the Tene Briut project at Hillel Yaffe Medical Center in Hadera and Bar Ilan University's department of translation and interpreting studies.
Open communication, free of language gaps, has been shown to be essential to the delivery of healthcare. A recent study of Ethiopian immigrants showed significant gaps in the extent to which they make effective use of medical services compared to the rest of the population. The study pointed to a clear need for better communication and overcoming misunderstandings stemming from cultural differences.
One of the responses to these unsettling findings was the decision to launch a program designed to train professional interpreters. The course consisted of lectures on linguistic and cultural issues, professional ethics, the challenge of remote interpreting, as well as a review of medical terminology in the two languages. The main part of the course, however, comprised open discussions concerning the role of the interpreter (whether as a "transparent tube," culture broker, language mediator, patient advocate or ad hoc social worker). Each of the participants also took part in simulated sessions, playing an interpreter between an Amharic-speaking patient and a Hebrew-speaking physician. The simulations, which were filmed in a real health fund clinic, were then analyzed to evaluate the interpreters' performance and effectiveness.
The program was initiated by Dr. Anat Jaffe, chief of the endocrinology department at the Hadera hospital, and Prof. Miriam Shlesinger, head of the BIU translation studies department. They worked with Tene Briut coordinator Pekkado (Yossi) Gadamo; epidemiologist Dr. Eltchee Seffefe; linguist Dr. Embesse Tabbere and Michal Schuster, a BIU doctoral student whose work centers on intercultural issues in healthcare delivery. They are hoping to launch the service soon, once the technical arrangements have been completed and funding has been secured.
As for the recent graduates, who are all too familiar with the hardships encountered by non-Hebrew-speaking immigrants, they too are eager to begin placing the members of their community on an equal footing in accessing medical care.
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