Errors of the war on terror
By George Soros
Ha'aretz, Friday, September 1, 2006
Israel's failure to subdue Hezbollah demonstrates the many weaknesses of the war-on-terror concept. One weakness is that even if the targets are terrorists, the victims are often innocent civilians, and their suffering reinforces the terrorist cause.
In response to Hezbollah's attacks, Israel was justified in wanting to destroy the movement and to protect itself against the threat of missiles on its border. However, Israel should have taken greater care to minimize collateral damage. The civilian casualties and material damage inflicted on Lebanon inflamed Muslims and world opinion against Israel, and converted Hezbollah from aggressors to heroes of resistance. Weakening Lebanon has also made it more difficult to rein in Hezbollah.
Another weakness of the war-on-terror concept is that it relies on military action and rules out political approaches. Israel withdrew from Lebanon and then from Gaza unilaterally, rather than negotiating political settlements with the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Authority. The strengthening of Hezbollah and Hamas was a direct consequence of that approach. The war-on-terror concept stands in the way of recognizing this fact because it separates "us" from "them," and denies the fact that our actions may shape their behavior.
A third weakness is that the war-on-terror concept lumps together different political movements that use terrorist tactics. It fails to distinguish between Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaida or the Sunni insurrection and the Mahdi militia in Iraq. Yet all these terrorist manifestations are different and require different responses. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah can be treated merely as targets in the war on terror because they have deep roots in their societies, yet profound differences exist between them.
Looking back it is easy to see where Israeli policy went wrong. When Mahmoud Abbas was elected chairman of the PA, Israel should have gone out of its way to strengthen him and his reformist team.
When Israel withdrew from Gaza, the former head of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, negotiated a six-point plan for the Middle East on behalf of the Quartet (Russia, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations). It included opening crossings between Gaza and the West Bank, an airport and seaport in Gaza, opening the border with Egypt, and transferring the greenhouses abandoned by Israeli settlers into Arab hands. None of the six points was implemented.
This contributed to Hamas' electoral victory. The Bush administration, having pushed Israel to hold elections, then backed Israel's refusal to deal with a Hamas government. The effect has been to impose further hardship on the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, Abbas was able to forge an agreement with the political arm of Hamas for the formation of a unity government. It was to foil this agreement that the military branch of Hamas, run from Damascus, engaged in the provocation that brought a heavy-handed response from Israel - which in turn incited Hezbollah to further provocation, opening a second front. That is how extremists play off against each other to destroy any chance of political progress.
Israel has been a participant in this game and President Bush bought into this flawed policy, uncritically supporting Israel. Events have shown that this policy leads to an escalation of violence. The process has advanced to the point where Israel's unquestioned military superiority is no longer sufficient to overcome the negative consequences of its policy. Israel is now more endangered existentially than it was at the time of the Oslo Accord. Similarly, the United States has become less safe since President Bush declared war on terror.
The time has come to realize that today's policies are counterproductive. There will be no end to the vicious circle of escalating violence without a political settlement of the Palestine question. In fact, the prospects for engaging in negotiations are better now than they were a few months ago. Israelis must realize that a military deterrent is not sufficient on its own. And Arabs, having redeemed themselves on the battlefield, may be more willing to entertain a compromise.
Strong voices argue that Israel must never negotiate from a position of weakness. They are wrong. Israel's position is liable to become weaker the longer it persists on its present course. Similarly, Hezbollah, having tasted the sense but not the reality of victory (and egged on by Syria and Iran), may prove recalcitrant.
But that is where the difference between Hezbollah and Hamas comes into play. The people of Palestine yearn for peace and relief from suffering. The political - as distinct from the military - wing of Hamas must be responsive to their desires. It is not too late for Israel to encourage and to deal with an Abbas-led Palestinian unity government as the first step toward a better balanced approach. What is missing is a U.S. government that is not blinded by the war-on-terror concept.
Financier and philanthropist George Soros is author of "The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror" (Public Affairs, 2006?).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006. www.project-syndicate.org
Friday, September 01, 2006
And the sting in the tale: the Olmert file at the State Comptroller's Office
Touch and go for PM
By Yossi Verter
Ha'aretz, Friday, September 1, 2006
Ehud Olmert's credit line was exhausted this week. From the rock bottom at which he found himself so early in his term of office, he is now subject to the mercies of the public, a prisoner in the hands of a fickle people that raises its leaders to the heights, and then throws them down to the depths with the velocity of a roller coaster. From now on, Olmert will be required to pay his bills up front. If he does well, he will gain support; if he does badly, or doesn't do at all, then he will be tormented further, until he is crushed.
We have already had leaders that fell and rose and fell again: Yitzhak Rabin, one year after his election, was receiving poor grades. And then came Oslo and he soared upwards, but on the eve of his assassination, Netanyahu was all over him in the polls. Ariel Sharon hit a nadir during his first year on the job, when buses were blowing up on a daily basis and he just stood there, powerless. His fortunes changed when he embarked on Operation Defensive Shield and regained his popularity.
Is Olmert capable of a recovery? Will the across-the-board dissatisfaction with the current leadership overcome concerns about what the alternative might bring? Olmert is not allowing himself to wallow in melancholy. He has no plans to place his head in the noose in order to wring a round of applause from the crowd. We have to work, he is telling his people; we have to produce results.
He feels that the criticism over the committees he set up will soon fade away. The people that he appointed are serious people, who will not be afraid to say what they think, to the same degree that the people who will appear before the committee - and everyone will appear, he says - will be afraid not to tell the truth, the whole truth and only the truth. The members of the committee are no suckers. He is amused by the criticism that he has known David Ivri for years, or that Yedidya Yaari is the CEO of Rafael. How could he not know Ivri? And what would he do to Rafael if the conclusions of the committee are not to his liking - close down the most important defense industry in the country?
The 20-20 hindsight makes him chuckle. Let's suppose he would have opted for the proposal to wait 48 hours, and only then attack. In the course of those 48 hours would he have looked into the state of the army's wartime equipment bases? The flak jackets? To what level of detail should a prime minister descend? The critical decision was to go to war. He takes full responsibility for it. Any explanations will be given to the Admoni committee.
Aides say that any decision he would have made would have drawn criticism. Had he decided to set up a state commission of inquiry, critics would be saying that he is a dishrag and is only dragging the country into a protracted state of paralysis. Dalia Itzik, who broke down in tears this week in Olmert's office, after describing to him her visits to the impoverished homes of bereaved families, says that saying no to a state commission of inquiry is also a mark of leadership.
On political matters, he is of two minds. He doesn't know what we would do if in the middle of next week the cabinet ministers of the Labor Party, led by Amir Peretz, unanimously voted against his inquiry committees. Evidently, he would grin and bear it.
In his own party, he has - as yet - not come across any serious problems. In spite of all the trouble, he is still considered the glue that holds everyone together there. His status in Kadima is much stronger than that of Peretz in Labor, because he has no serious competitors in Kadima. He has no one to compare with Sharon's "Netanyahu," the natural heir. This week, the entire leadership of his party expressed support for him: Peres, Dichter, Sheetrit, Bar-On, and Hirchson.
Tzipi Livni, his deputy, has not yet taken a position. Once again, she has chosen to remain silent. In principle, she, too, backs the solution of a committee of inquiry as opposed to a state commission, but her support is conditional and somewhat halfhearted: if the commission were to execute the inquiry in a businesslike, speedy and fundamental manner, then Livni would consider it a reasonable solution. But she still has to find out more about the mandate of the committee. Until she is convinced, she will not have a good word to say about it. Olmert can wait.
On Saturday night, about half of the participants in the bull session of Olmert's advisers and counselors, which took place in the Prime Minister's residence, were in favor of establishing a state commission of inquiry. The director general of the Prime Minister's Office, Raanan Dinur, cabinet secretary Israel Maimon, adviser Lior Horev and deputy head of staff Oved Yehezkel, told him to go for the state commission. It will buy you two years of quiet, they said. Only Reuven Adler, Sharon's senior adviser, felt that there was no need to investigate anything, and certainly not to set up a state commission. Adler was close to Sharon, back in '82. He accompanied him to the Kahan Commission, and experienced the humiliation from up close. Ever since then, Adler has never wanted to hear the words "state commission" again.
The dream and its remains
Benjamin Netanyahu made a strategic decision this week: He wants to be prime minister. On the face of it, there is nothing new to that. Nevertheless, Netanyahu's decision has one meaning: He will not join Olmert, even if the Labor Party withdraws and he is offered a respectable position, as well as respect, to enter the coalition. I, he says, in private conversation, am going to replace Olmert - not save him.
Nor will he join even if Olmert leaves and his place as prime minister is taken by another Kadima minister: Sheetrit, Dichter, Livni or Mofaz, each of whom considers him or herself a candidate, and who intends to contend for the Olmert legacy. Netanyahu rates his chances of becoming prime minister in this Knesset as good. The scenario that is making the rounds of his inner circle goes something like this: In the course of debates over the 2007 budget, it becomes obvious that the coalition is not equal to the task. The clock starts to count down to early elections, and then a third (the minimum required by law for withdrawal - Y.V.) or more members of the Kadima faction, who do not owe anything to Olmert, or to Kadima, withdraw from the party and join the Likud faction. Only such a move, which is not without logic, would get Netanyahu back into the Prime Minister's office.
In this scenario, Netanyahu could form a government with the ultra-Orthodox and the Right and the pensioners. The only thing that spoils his optimistic mood is the Avigdor Lieberman question. Netanyahu is alarmed at the prospect of Lieberman destroying his dream by joining the coalition. Now, with Olmert's plan to unilaterally withdraw from West Bank territories no longer on the table, the common denominator between Lieberman and Olmert is broader than that between Amir Peretz and Olmert. Perhaps this is also the problem: that as long as Labor is in the coalition, Lieberman will have nothing to do with it. He doesn't want to be some superfluous add-on. He wants to be a senior coalition partner, one who sets policy and wields influence. This is why he is playing hard to get, and naming such a high price: minister of defense. Lieberman knows that if he is to be Olmert's lifeline - Olmert is prepared to pay full market price. And if not, well then, it didn't hurt to ask.
Yatom the letdown
Danny Yatom was GOC of Central Command, Director of the Mossad, military secretary to Prime Minister Begin and head of Prime Minister Ehud Barak's political-security staff. He understands security, but as a politician he has not been a wild success. Since entering politics, buck privates and junior officers in his own party have run circles around him on a daily basis. Now he feels his time has come. That the people yearn for a leader with security expertise. He has announced his candidacy for the party leadership. Essentially, he is running to improve his standing, to upgrade his ranking in the party leadership. Yatom openly admits that if in the course of his campaign he comes to understand that he would be getting in the way of someone else (for instance, Ehud Barak or Ami Ayalon) from beating Peretz - then he would not be an obstacle. But he is not at all convinced that Peretz will even run. In his opinion, Peretz will be forced to leave due to the conclusions reached by the committee that investigates his performance in the war. Yatom intends to ask to appear before the commission or commissions. During the war, he met with the defense minister. His testimony might possibly relate to a conversation they had. Yatom believes that his words would carry weight. He also estimates that Olmert could emerge unscathed.
Another politician in Peretz's party, who is also known for his security acumen, said this week that unlike Yatom he was not asked to see Peretz, even once. But who was in the practice of consulting with him on a regular basis, once a week? Olmert.
When I speak, the man said, there is going to be an earthquake. And so it is. They, the members of his party are closing in, from every direction, on Chairman Peretz. People who spoke with Peretz this week described him as a lonely man, who is surrounded by a few advisers who are trying in a panic to find him an "agenda" that would extricate him from the valley of the shadow of death - negotiations with Syria, support for a state commission of inquiry, or re-embrace of the social agenda in advance of the 2007 budget - but the opinion polls are having their effect.
Peretz describes himself as being between a rock and a hard place: the army, whose every morbidity and failure has suddenly become his problem; and Olmert, who has an agenda and troubles of his own. Between the two, he is being pressured by the rebels in his faction, who hover about like a school of sharks around an exhausted baby whale.
One member of his faction, who actually supports him, told him this week: Go for a state commission of inquiry, go for it with all the gusto you can muster. After all, you couldn't get less than the single percentage point that you received (in response to the question of suitability as prime minister in a Dahaf poll published in Yedioth Ahronoth - Y.V.).
Fourth branch of government
The flare-up that erupted this week between Ehud Olmert and Micha Lindenstrauss was allegedly about manners and proper behavior: The State Comptroller, an overweening and unpredictable person, who was seemingly insulted by Olmert's having asked him through the media to investigate the handling of the war on the home front. This, despite the fact that Olmert acted in accordance with the law, and even took pains to call Lindenstrauss "the Honorable State Comptroller." One imagines that there are greater insults than this.
Anyone who knows what is going on between these two men understands that the sarcastic statements exchanged between their offices are concealing something else. The report Lindenstrauss and his subordinates are preparing about the purchase of the Olmerts' apartment at 8 Cremieux Street in Jerusalem is almost complete. Sources in the Comptroller's office have been telling politicians and reporters that Olmert's days in office are numbered. And that is before Olmert has even been questioned or given an opportunity to give his version. These leaks, say aides to Olmert, essentially make any further questioning superfluous. If it has clearly been decided up front that Olmert is "finished" then what form would the questioning take? Off the record, they say things about the Comptroller that no newspaper would dare print.
In any event, it is obvious that this preposterous debate is only a promo of what awaits us in the Olmert-Lindenstrauss arena. One diplomat recently related, in private conversation, that he was invited a few weeks ago to a meeting with a very senior official in the State Comptroller's office. There are four branches of government in Israel, he was told, not three. The judicial branch, the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the comptroller branch. The diplomat was surprised. That is not what he thought about Israel. In the same meeting, he was treated to some juicy details about the Olmert file.
By Yossi Verter
Ha'aretz, Friday, September 1, 2006
Ehud Olmert's credit line was exhausted this week. From the rock bottom at which he found himself so early in his term of office, he is now subject to the mercies of the public, a prisoner in the hands of a fickle people that raises its leaders to the heights, and then throws them down to the depths with the velocity of a roller coaster. From now on, Olmert will be required to pay his bills up front. If he does well, he will gain support; if he does badly, or doesn't do at all, then he will be tormented further, until he is crushed.
We have already had leaders that fell and rose and fell again: Yitzhak Rabin, one year after his election, was receiving poor grades. And then came Oslo and he soared upwards, but on the eve of his assassination, Netanyahu was all over him in the polls. Ariel Sharon hit a nadir during his first year on the job, when buses were blowing up on a daily basis and he just stood there, powerless. His fortunes changed when he embarked on Operation Defensive Shield and regained his popularity.
Is Olmert capable of a recovery? Will the across-the-board dissatisfaction with the current leadership overcome concerns about what the alternative might bring? Olmert is not allowing himself to wallow in melancholy. He has no plans to place his head in the noose in order to wring a round of applause from the crowd. We have to work, he is telling his people; we have to produce results.
He feels that the criticism over the committees he set up will soon fade away. The people that he appointed are serious people, who will not be afraid to say what they think, to the same degree that the people who will appear before the committee - and everyone will appear, he says - will be afraid not to tell the truth, the whole truth and only the truth. The members of the committee are no suckers. He is amused by the criticism that he has known David Ivri for years, or that Yedidya Yaari is the CEO of Rafael. How could he not know Ivri? And what would he do to Rafael if the conclusions of the committee are not to his liking - close down the most important defense industry in the country?
The 20-20 hindsight makes him chuckle. Let's suppose he would have opted for the proposal to wait 48 hours, and only then attack. In the course of those 48 hours would he have looked into the state of the army's wartime equipment bases? The flak jackets? To what level of detail should a prime minister descend? The critical decision was to go to war. He takes full responsibility for it. Any explanations will be given to the Admoni committee.
Aides say that any decision he would have made would have drawn criticism. Had he decided to set up a state commission of inquiry, critics would be saying that he is a dishrag and is only dragging the country into a protracted state of paralysis. Dalia Itzik, who broke down in tears this week in Olmert's office, after describing to him her visits to the impoverished homes of bereaved families, says that saying no to a state commission of inquiry is also a mark of leadership.
On political matters, he is of two minds. He doesn't know what we would do if in the middle of next week the cabinet ministers of the Labor Party, led by Amir Peretz, unanimously voted against his inquiry committees. Evidently, he would grin and bear it.
In his own party, he has - as yet - not come across any serious problems. In spite of all the trouble, he is still considered the glue that holds everyone together there. His status in Kadima is much stronger than that of Peretz in Labor, because he has no serious competitors in Kadima. He has no one to compare with Sharon's "Netanyahu," the natural heir. This week, the entire leadership of his party expressed support for him: Peres, Dichter, Sheetrit, Bar-On, and Hirchson.
Tzipi Livni, his deputy, has not yet taken a position. Once again, she has chosen to remain silent. In principle, she, too, backs the solution of a committee of inquiry as opposed to a state commission, but her support is conditional and somewhat halfhearted: if the commission were to execute the inquiry in a businesslike, speedy and fundamental manner, then Livni would consider it a reasonable solution. But she still has to find out more about the mandate of the committee. Until she is convinced, she will not have a good word to say about it. Olmert can wait.
On Saturday night, about half of the participants in the bull session of Olmert's advisers and counselors, which took place in the Prime Minister's residence, were in favor of establishing a state commission of inquiry. The director general of the Prime Minister's Office, Raanan Dinur, cabinet secretary Israel Maimon, adviser Lior Horev and deputy head of staff Oved Yehezkel, told him to go for the state commission. It will buy you two years of quiet, they said. Only Reuven Adler, Sharon's senior adviser, felt that there was no need to investigate anything, and certainly not to set up a state commission. Adler was close to Sharon, back in '82. He accompanied him to the Kahan Commission, and experienced the humiliation from up close. Ever since then, Adler has never wanted to hear the words "state commission" again.
The dream and its remains
Benjamin Netanyahu made a strategic decision this week: He wants to be prime minister. On the face of it, there is nothing new to that. Nevertheless, Netanyahu's decision has one meaning: He will not join Olmert, even if the Labor Party withdraws and he is offered a respectable position, as well as respect, to enter the coalition. I, he says, in private conversation, am going to replace Olmert - not save him.
Nor will he join even if Olmert leaves and his place as prime minister is taken by another Kadima minister: Sheetrit, Dichter, Livni or Mofaz, each of whom considers him or herself a candidate, and who intends to contend for the Olmert legacy. Netanyahu rates his chances of becoming prime minister in this Knesset as good. The scenario that is making the rounds of his inner circle goes something like this: In the course of debates over the 2007 budget, it becomes obvious that the coalition is not equal to the task. The clock starts to count down to early elections, and then a third (the minimum required by law for withdrawal - Y.V.) or more members of the Kadima faction, who do not owe anything to Olmert, or to Kadima, withdraw from the party and join the Likud faction. Only such a move, which is not without logic, would get Netanyahu back into the Prime Minister's office.
In this scenario, Netanyahu could form a government with the ultra-Orthodox and the Right and the pensioners. The only thing that spoils his optimistic mood is the Avigdor Lieberman question. Netanyahu is alarmed at the prospect of Lieberman destroying his dream by joining the coalition. Now, with Olmert's plan to unilaterally withdraw from West Bank territories no longer on the table, the common denominator between Lieberman and Olmert is broader than that between Amir Peretz and Olmert. Perhaps this is also the problem: that as long as Labor is in the coalition, Lieberman will have nothing to do with it. He doesn't want to be some superfluous add-on. He wants to be a senior coalition partner, one who sets policy and wields influence. This is why he is playing hard to get, and naming such a high price: minister of defense. Lieberman knows that if he is to be Olmert's lifeline - Olmert is prepared to pay full market price. And if not, well then, it didn't hurt to ask.
Yatom the letdown
Danny Yatom was GOC of Central Command, Director of the Mossad, military secretary to Prime Minister Begin and head of Prime Minister Ehud Barak's political-security staff. He understands security, but as a politician he has not been a wild success. Since entering politics, buck privates and junior officers in his own party have run circles around him on a daily basis. Now he feels his time has come. That the people yearn for a leader with security expertise. He has announced his candidacy for the party leadership. Essentially, he is running to improve his standing, to upgrade his ranking in the party leadership. Yatom openly admits that if in the course of his campaign he comes to understand that he would be getting in the way of someone else (for instance, Ehud Barak or Ami Ayalon) from beating Peretz - then he would not be an obstacle. But he is not at all convinced that Peretz will even run. In his opinion, Peretz will be forced to leave due to the conclusions reached by the committee that investigates his performance in the war. Yatom intends to ask to appear before the commission or commissions. During the war, he met with the defense minister. His testimony might possibly relate to a conversation they had. Yatom believes that his words would carry weight. He also estimates that Olmert could emerge unscathed.
Another politician in Peretz's party, who is also known for his security acumen, said this week that unlike Yatom he was not asked to see Peretz, even once. But who was in the practice of consulting with him on a regular basis, once a week? Olmert.
When I speak, the man said, there is going to be an earthquake. And so it is. They, the members of his party are closing in, from every direction, on Chairman Peretz. People who spoke with Peretz this week described him as a lonely man, who is surrounded by a few advisers who are trying in a panic to find him an "agenda" that would extricate him from the valley of the shadow of death - negotiations with Syria, support for a state commission of inquiry, or re-embrace of the social agenda in advance of the 2007 budget - but the opinion polls are having their effect.
Peretz describes himself as being between a rock and a hard place: the army, whose every morbidity and failure has suddenly become his problem; and Olmert, who has an agenda and troubles of his own. Between the two, he is being pressured by the rebels in his faction, who hover about like a school of sharks around an exhausted baby whale.
One member of his faction, who actually supports him, told him this week: Go for a state commission of inquiry, go for it with all the gusto you can muster. After all, you couldn't get less than the single percentage point that you received (in response to the question of suitability as prime minister in a Dahaf poll published in Yedioth Ahronoth - Y.V.).
Fourth branch of government
The flare-up that erupted this week between Ehud Olmert and Micha Lindenstrauss was allegedly about manners and proper behavior: The State Comptroller, an overweening and unpredictable person, who was seemingly insulted by Olmert's having asked him through the media to investigate the handling of the war on the home front. This, despite the fact that Olmert acted in accordance with the law, and even took pains to call Lindenstrauss "the Honorable State Comptroller." One imagines that there are greater insults than this.
Anyone who knows what is going on between these two men understands that the sarcastic statements exchanged between their offices are concealing something else. The report Lindenstrauss and his subordinates are preparing about the purchase of the Olmerts' apartment at 8 Cremieux Street in Jerusalem is almost complete. Sources in the Comptroller's office have been telling politicians and reporters that Olmert's days in office are numbered. And that is before Olmert has even been questioned or given an opportunity to give his version. These leaks, say aides to Olmert, essentially make any further questioning superfluous. If it has clearly been decided up front that Olmert is "finished" then what form would the questioning take? Off the record, they say things about the Comptroller that no newspaper would dare print.
In any event, it is obvious that this preposterous debate is only a promo of what awaits us in the Olmert-Lindenstrauss arena. One diplomat recently related, in private conversation, that he was invited a few weeks ago to a meeting with a very senior official in the State Comptroller's office. There are four branches of government in Israel, he was told, not three. The judicial branch, the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the comptroller branch. The diplomat was surprised. That is not what he thought about Israel. In the same meeting, he was treated to some juicy details about the Olmert file.
"Someone was trying to kill me by throwing weapons out of the sky..."
From my editor, Donna, who in a way started this blog when I wrote to her about my 1991 Gulf War memories of cleaning out our "air raid shelter on Saturday evening, July 15 (an eternity ago), here's a note dated Thursday, 31 August - just over six weeks later.
The "shloshim" to which she refers is the marking of 30 days since the death of Dave Lelchuk, their kibbutznik friend who was killed by a rocket - see the item on August 3 - "A one-man SPCA".
On another note, I guess we are back to normal here, whatever that means, though I still cannot get it out of the back of my mind that someone was trying to kill me by throwing weapons out of the sky...
Tomorrow is the shloshim for Dave. Time marches on.
The "shloshim" to which she refers is the marking of 30 days since the death of Dave Lelchuk, their kibbutznik friend who was killed by a rocket - see the item on August 3 - "A one-man SPCA".
On another note, I guess we are back to normal here, whatever that means, though I still cannot get it out of the back of my mind that someone was trying to kill me by throwing weapons out of the sky...
Tomorrow is the shloshim for Dave. Time marches on.
Thursday, August 31, 2006
Nasrallah's speech and Israel's leaders...
Iran at the mike
By Danny Rubinstein
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
Hassan Nasrallah's surprising speech Sunday will almost definitely save Prime Minister Ehud Olmert from a government probe. Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz may also breathe a certain sigh of relief. Nasrallah's statements represented a severe blow to protest movements, already in the throes of a difficult lift-off. The explanation is simple: Dramatic statements voiced by Hezbollah's leader were summarized in two words in most Israeli, Palestinian and foreign media outlets: "Nasrallah regrets."
If Nasrallah is truly remorseful and is admitting he made a mistake, that is in practice an admission of failure - since war is generally a zero-sum game. If one side loses, the conclusion is the other side won. In other words, Olmert's government and the Israel Defense Forces, led by Halutz, come out of Nasrallah's speech looking not half bad.
If that is true, who needs a serious committee of inquiry? This may represent an internal Lebanese account, an attempt to repel criticism that Hezbollah caused the destruction of that nation. The Iranian leadership is also undoubtedly connected to Nasrallah's statements. In the startling, more than two-hour interview, there were several extraordinary declarations: First and foremost was the actual expression of regret and the admission that a mistake may have been made. Political leaders are not accustomed to making statements like that.
The granting of an interview surprised the correspondent summoned to Nasrallah's hiding place. Palestinian reporters wrote yesterday that this was the first time since the war began that Nasrallah had been interviewed by a Lebanese television channel not operated by Hezbollah. According to Palestinians, Nasrallah's statements did not reflect distress, but the opposite: The fact that he does not fear self-criticism is proof of his credibility.
One might ascribe Nasrallah's speech to Iranian involvement in South Lebanon and the extensive Hezbollah bunkers just discovered near Israel's northern border. "An underground city," Israeli spokesmen called the structures, which covered two square kilometers and included concrete columns, telephone lines and other facilities. All this, intended for use in an expanded, comprehensive campaign, was undoubtedly established with Iranian assistance.
The construction of a system of this type costs a fortune and demands expertise and means. Iran, which provided Hezbollah with 13,000 missiles and assisted in building the enormous bunkers, did not do this so that Hezbollah might abduct two soldiers to be traded for a handful of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. Iran apparently had grander intentions, like the initiation of a war against Israel should the Americans - with or without Israeli assistance - attack Iran to thwart its development of nuclear weapons.
Against that background, some Iranians were angry with Hezbollah for permitting the war to expand for no reason. According to one Palestinian commentator, Iranian pressure prevented Nasrallah from using long-range Zelzal missiles capable of reaching "beyond, beyond Haifa," and as far as Tel Aviv. According to this theory, Nasrallah's relatively moderate statements were influenced by Iran to correspond with things said by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a speech two days ago. Iran is not a threat to anybody, "not even the Zionist regime that is the arch-enemy of all the peoples of the region," Ahmadinejad said in his speech.
Is Iran trying to buy time to continue to build its nuclear capability? This all remains an assumption. For now, it is clear that Nasrallah, influenced by Iran to one extent or another, helped Olmert, Peretz and Halutz ride waves of aspersion.
By Danny Rubinstein
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
Hassan Nasrallah's surprising speech Sunday will almost definitely save Prime Minister Ehud Olmert from a government probe. Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz may also breathe a certain sigh of relief. Nasrallah's statements represented a severe blow to protest movements, already in the throes of a difficult lift-off. The explanation is simple: Dramatic statements voiced by Hezbollah's leader were summarized in two words in most Israeli, Palestinian and foreign media outlets: "Nasrallah regrets."
If Nasrallah is truly remorseful and is admitting he made a mistake, that is in practice an admission of failure - since war is generally a zero-sum game. If one side loses, the conclusion is the other side won. In other words, Olmert's government and the Israel Defense Forces, led by Halutz, come out of Nasrallah's speech looking not half bad.
If that is true, who needs a serious committee of inquiry? This may represent an internal Lebanese account, an attempt to repel criticism that Hezbollah caused the destruction of that nation. The Iranian leadership is also undoubtedly connected to Nasrallah's statements. In the startling, more than two-hour interview, there were several extraordinary declarations: First and foremost was the actual expression of regret and the admission that a mistake may have been made. Political leaders are not accustomed to making statements like that.
The granting of an interview surprised the correspondent summoned to Nasrallah's hiding place. Palestinian reporters wrote yesterday that this was the first time since the war began that Nasrallah had been interviewed by a Lebanese television channel not operated by Hezbollah. According to Palestinians, Nasrallah's statements did not reflect distress, but the opposite: The fact that he does not fear self-criticism is proof of his credibility.
One might ascribe Nasrallah's speech to Iranian involvement in South Lebanon and the extensive Hezbollah bunkers just discovered near Israel's northern border. "An underground city," Israeli spokesmen called the structures, which covered two square kilometers and included concrete columns, telephone lines and other facilities. All this, intended for use in an expanded, comprehensive campaign, was undoubtedly established with Iranian assistance.
The construction of a system of this type costs a fortune and demands expertise and means. Iran, which provided Hezbollah with 13,000 missiles and assisted in building the enormous bunkers, did not do this so that Hezbollah might abduct two soldiers to be traded for a handful of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. Iran apparently had grander intentions, like the initiation of a war against Israel should the Americans - with or without Israeli assistance - attack Iran to thwart its development of nuclear weapons.
Against that background, some Iranians were angry with Hezbollah for permitting the war to expand for no reason. According to one Palestinian commentator, Iranian pressure prevented Nasrallah from using long-range Zelzal missiles capable of reaching "beyond, beyond Haifa," and as far as Tel Aviv. According to this theory, Nasrallah's relatively moderate statements were influenced by Iran to correspond with things said by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a speech two days ago. Iran is not a threat to anybody, "not even the Zionist regime that is the arch-enemy of all the peoples of the region," Ahmadinejad said in his speech.
Is Iran trying to buy time to continue to build its nuclear capability? This all remains an assumption. For now, it is clear that Nasrallah, influenced by Iran to one extent or another, helped Olmert, Peretz and Halutz ride waves of aspersion.
Hopelessly untrained and unequipped - reservists about foul-ups
Lambs to the slaughter?
Larry Derfner
The Jerusalem Post, August 24, 2006
'Yitzhak's" paratroopers unit spent the war going from one South Lebanese village to another, taking cover inside abandoned houses against the missiles Hizbullah was firing 2-3 km away, lacking weapons of sufficient range to fire back. From time to time they got orders to seek out Hizbullah on the ground, but every time the orders were cancelled at the last minute. Asked what they did inside the abandoned houses when they weren't waiting out flying missiles, Yitzhak, 34, one of the unit's snipers, replied, "We played whist a lot of the time."
In the villages, they would ask their commanding officers what was going on, and never got a satisfactory answer. But after the cease-fire, when they crossed the border back into Israel, they sat down in front of their division commander and finally learned why they'd been kept away from the enemy.
"He said they didn't want us to get killed or kidnapped by Hizbullah, or by all the friendly fire that was going on," said Yitzhak, a government employee in civilian life.
"Lior," also 34, and also a paratrooper but from another unit, told an almost identical story to Yitzhak's - waiting out the war in abandoned houses, unequipped to return fire at the distant Hizbullah positions, being given orders to advance that were always cancelled. And the explanation Lior and his comrades were given for why they weren't going after Hizbullah also matched the one Yitzhak heard.
"At one point our division commander told us that killing two or three terrorists wasn't worth the price," said Lior, a computer technician.
The movement of embittered reserve soldiers that began this week with a petition and protest camp outside the Knesset is carrying the message that the political and military leadership wasn't aggressive enough during the war, that the cease-fire left Israel still vulnerable to Hizbullah - that they didn't, as the saying goes, let the IDF win.
The petition signed by hundreds of members of the Spearhead brigade accused the leadership of getting "cold feet," of "inaction," and insisted that in future wars, their missions "be carried out by striving to engage in combat." This was also the tenor of the discussions being held by the hundreds of protesting reservists camped out at the Rose Garden next to the Knesset.
However, it has become clear from the accounts of reservists that in many cases, the reluctance to send Israeli troops into battle against Hizbullah grew out of the realization by commanding officers that the soldiers would have been going on suicide missions.
Major Adam Kima was imprisoned (but released after two days) when he refused to lead his platoon of some 40 combat engineers on a corridor-clearing mission on the eve of the cease-fire, because his platoon was improperly equipped to fight off the ambushes expected along the way. Five of his soldiers were imprisoned along with him. Yet Kima's mother reportedly received calls from parents of soldiers in the platoon thanking her son for saving their lives.
Yediot Aharonot columnist Nahum Barnea, embedded with the Alexandroni Brigade, reported that a commanding officer, Major Nati Barak, decided not to send his soldiers after Hizbullah guerillas hiding in the village where they were camped. "I have mercy on my soldiers' lives," Barak said.
And in Ha'aretz, Yonatan Nir, who was injured in the war, wrote how he and some of his elite unit comrades decided to tell their commanding officers that they were hopelessly untrained and unequipped for the mission they were assigned - to clear Hizbullah fighters out of a village. As a result, the superior officers cancelled the mission, "claiming that they did not know that we had not been properly trained for it and they even praised us for admitting this fact," wrote Nir, adding that the village turned out to have "enough terrorists to cause a significant number of casualties."
Protesting reserve soldiers are raising two main points - 1) that they didn't have the proper training, equipment and weapons, food and water, and battlefield intelligence to fight as well as they could have, and 2) that they too were often prevented from fighting.
Yet from the accounts of reservists, the very reason that they were prevented from fighting was, in many cases, precisely because their officers realized that they hadn't been properly prepared to take on Hizbullah.
"We weren't ready for this war," said Lior. "We didn't get any intelligence about how Hizbullah works, what are its weaknesses, what are its strengths. It's no tragedy that we didn't get to engage Hizbullah on the battlefield because if we would have, I'm not sure that we would have had the advantage."
THE DISADVANTAGES IDF reservists had in comparison to Hizbullah troops were absolutely staggering. Hizbullah had anti-tank missile launchers that proved the bane of the IDF's existence, not only blowing up tanks but posing such a threat to heavy IDF vehicles that supply trucks carrying food and water were held back for fear of getting blown up, leaving soldiers to fight in the torrid, humid climate for two days and more with hardly any sustenance.
By contrast, Lior's unit had two Law anti-tank missile launchers for 30 soldiers, but worst of all, he said, none of the soldiers knew how to fire them. "I've never fired a Law in my life. When Hizbullah is firing anti-tank missiles at us, how do I respond?" he said.
Other deficiencies mentioned by Lior, a reserve paratrooper, included: No target practice before entry into Lebanon, so rifles weren't properly aimed; no thermal night vision devices, which the IDF has in stock and which Hizbullah had in the field; aerial maps from 2000, with up-to-date maps arriving only towards the end.
Yitzhak, a reserve sniper, noted that the 100 or so soldiers in his unit were forced to take cover in only two houses of an abandoned village, which meant that a direct hit from a missile on one of the houses could have killed some 50 soldiers. The reason: "We only had two communication radios for the whole unit, and it was considered too dangerous to put soldiers in the village's other empty houses without a communication radio."
The soldiers had "red dot" sights for their rifles, Yitzhak said, but no equipment to fix the sights to the rifles. When they arrived at the base before going into Lebanon, there was such chaos in the weapons and ammunition warehouse that all the soldiers from the various units "just broke open the crates and took whatever they wanted, without signing for it. Lots of soldiers went into battle without enough ammunition," he said, noting that his unit was told to pack one pair of underpants and one pair of socks because they would be back in Israel after two days.
"We didn't get back for 10 days," Yitzhak noted.
SITTING ON the grass of the Rose Garden was "David," 27, a combat medic with the Alexandroni Brigade who had joined the reservists' march from Mevaseret Zion on Monday. "When we first got to the base and got our kitbags, a lot of us were missing basic things like combat vests and bullet-proof vests," he said, noting that he had no medic's vest and had to stuff his medical supplies wherever he could.
Unlike Yitzhak's and Lior's paratroopers units, the Alexandroni Brigade fought Hizbullah several times during the war. But because of the awful logistical conditions, the fighting was much harder than it should have been. "Our first mission was to reach a position that controlled the coastal road, and we reached it. But while it should have taken 36 hours, it took eight days," said David.
One reason was the lack of food and water. "We went as long as two-and-a-half days with daily rations of a can of tuna, a can of corn and a couple of pieces of bread - to share between four soldiers. So we got slowed up because 25 soldiers collapsed from dehydration and had to be evacuated. Everyone lost five, six, seven kilos in the 10 days we were there," he said.
Meir Pa'il, one of Israel's leading military historians, said this is the first time in all of Israel's wars that the reserve soldiers have complained to such a degree, and with such unanimity, about a comprehensive breakdown in practical IDF preparedness for battle. By contrast, he noted, the reservists' protests after the Yom Kippur War were over the failure to anticipate the Egyptian-Syrian attack, not over the lack of food and basic equipment.
"There are a lot of shlemiels in the army establishment," he said, while stressing that the failures of preparedness still didn't amount to a "total catastrophe" that by itself could spell defeat in war, because Israel's military strength can still make up for the oversights. He also noted that while such complaints aren't heard from the regular army, which stays prepared for battle on a daily basis, the reserves make up over 80% of the army ranks in war.
The Spearhead Brigade's petition speaks of a "crisis of confidence between us as fighters and the higher echelons," and both David and Lior gave personal testimony to this crisis. The "higher echelons" extends much deeper than just IDF chief Dan Halutz and the general staff.
"After we were released, the commander of our division spoke to us and said that while he would try to see that all these foul-ups didn't reappear the next time we had to go to battle, he couldn't promise that they wouldn't," said David. "The way he spoke to us was an insult to our intelligence, plain and simple. We have doctors, lawyers, company owners and government officials in our unit, and we leave our families and our jobs every year to serve our country, and he was talking to us like were were 18-year-olds.
"I've lost all faith in him," maintained David.
Lior said his immediate commanding officers told the unit that the kinds of demands they had, especially for equipment, were "small change," and that the IDF brass had much higher priorities for its budget, such as purchasing F-16 fighter jets.
"I still have faith in my company commander, my platoon commander, my brigade commander and even the division commander, but above them, the brigadier generals and up - I've lost my faith in them. If they can't understand the importance of taking care of the simple reserve soldier who drops everything to go wherever the army tells him, to risk his life, then I can't have faith in them anymore," he said.
These soldiers have fought the intifada for several years. They say they've never encountered such a comprehensive failure on the army's part.
"Some of the veterans in the unit were saying that this is the last reserve duty they'll ever pull, but I think I know them well enough to know that they'll be back next time we're called up," said Yitzhak. "But a lot of the guys in our unit this time were fresh out of the regular army - this was the first taste they've ever had of the reserves. After this, I wonder if they'll be ready to come back."
The reserve soldiers disagree on the goal of the protest; some say they won't leave the Rose Garden until the government agrees to a judicial inquiry committee into the handling of the war, some say they won't leave until Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Halutz resign, while others, like David, are waiting for some as-yet-unknown sign to convince them "that the leadership has heard what we have to say, is taking it to heart, and intends to learn the lessons of their failures."
By Monday evening, the number of reservists at the Rose Garden had grown from a handful to at least 200. Some had been released from duty that same day. And at this point, the protest appears to have traction; it is tapping in to overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the outcome of the war. The movement's assumption is that Israel could have won the war, but blew it. True or not, this is a widely-held view in this embittered nation. Which is why the protesters have the government and the IDF brass very worried.
Copyright 1995-2006 The Jerusalem Post
http://www.jpost.com/
Larry Derfner
The Jerusalem Post, August 24, 2006
'Yitzhak's" paratroopers unit spent the war going from one South Lebanese village to another, taking cover inside abandoned houses against the missiles Hizbullah was firing 2-3 km away, lacking weapons of sufficient range to fire back. From time to time they got orders to seek out Hizbullah on the ground, but every time the orders were cancelled at the last minute. Asked what they did inside the abandoned houses when they weren't waiting out flying missiles, Yitzhak, 34, one of the unit's snipers, replied, "We played whist a lot of the time."
In the villages, they would ask their commanding officers what was going on, and never got a satisfactory answer. But after the cease-fire, when they crossed the border back into Israel, they sat down in front of their division commander and finally learned why they'd been kept away from the enemy.
"He said they didn't want us to get killed or kidnapped by Hizbullah, or by all the friendly fire that was going on," said Yitzhak, a government employee in civilian life.
"Lior," also 34, and also a paratrooper but from another unit, told an almost identical story to Yitzhak's - waiting out the war in abandoned houses, unequipped to return fire at the distant Hizbullah positions, being given orders to advance that were always cancelled. And the explanation Lior and his comrades were given for why they weren't going after Hizbullah also matched the one Yitzhak heard.
"At one point our division commander told us that killing two or three terrorists wasn't worth the price," said Lior, a computer technician.
The movement of embittered reserve soldiers that began this week with a petition and protest camp outside the Knesset is carrying the message that the political and military leadership wasn't aggressive enough during the war, that the cease-fire left Israel still vulnerable to Hizbullah - that they didn't, as the saying goes, let the IDF win.
The petition signed by hundreds of members of the Spearhead brigade accused the leadership of getting "cold feet," of "inaction," and insisted that in future wars, their missions "be carried out by striving to engage in combat." This was also the tenor of the discussions being held by the hundreds of protesting reservists camped out at the Rose Garden next to the Knesset.
However, it has become clear from the accounts of reservists that in many cases, the reluctance to send Israeli troops into battle against Hizbullah grew out of the realization by commanding officers that the soldiers would have been going on suicide missions.
Major Adam Kima was imprisoned (but released after two days) when he refused to lead his platoon of some 40 combat engineers on a corridor-clearing mission on the eve of the cease-fire, because his platoon was improperly equipped to fight off the ambushes expected along the way. Five of his soldiers were imprisoned along with him. Yet Kima's mother reportedly received calls from parents of soldiers in the platoon thanking her son for saving their lives.
Yediot Aharonot columnist Nahum Barnea, embedded with the Alexandroni Brigade, reported that a commanding officer, Major Nati Barak, decided not to send his soldiers after Hizbullah guerillas hiding in the village where they were camped. "I have mercy on my soldiers' lives," Barak said.
And in Ha'aretz, Yonatan Nir, who was injured in the war, wrote how he and some of his elite unit comrades decided to tell their commanding officers that they were hopelessly untrained and unequipped for the mission they were assigned - to clear Hizbullah fighters out of a village. As a result, the superior officers cancelled the mission, "claiming that they did not know that we had not been properly trained for it and they even praised us for admitting this fact," wrote Nir, adding that the village turned out to have "enough terrorists to cause a significant number of casualties."
Protesting reserve soldiers are raising two main points - 1) that they didn't have the proper training, equipment and weapons, food and water, and battlefield intelligence to fight as well as they could have, and 2) that they too were often prevented from fighting.
Yet from the accounts of reservists, the very reason that they were prevented from fighting was, in many cases, precisely because their officers realized that they hadn't been properly prepared to take on Hizbullah.
"We weren't ready for this war," said Lior. "We didn't get any intelligence about how Hizbullah works, what are its weaknesses, what are its strengths. It's no tragedy that we didn't get to engage Hizbullah on the battlefield because if we would have, I'm not sure that we would have had the advantage."
THE DISADVANTAGES IDF reservists had in comparison to Hizbullah troops were absolutely staggering. Hizbullah had anti-tank missile launchers that proved the bane of the IDF's existence, not only blowing up tanks but posing such a threat to heavy IDF vehicles that supply trucks carrying food and water were held back for fear of getting blown up, leaving soldiers to fight in the torrid, humid climate for two days and more with hardly any sustenance.
By contrast, Lior's unit had two Law anti-tank missile launchers for 30 soldiers, but worst of all, he said, none of the soldiers knew how to fire them. "I've never fired a Law in my life. When Hizbullah is firing anti-tank missiles at us, how do I respond?" he said.
Other deficiencies mentioned by Lior, a reserve paratrooper, included: No target practice before entry into Lebanon, so rifles weren't properly aimed; no thermal night vision devices, which the IDF has in stock and which Hizbullah had in the field; aerial maps from 2000, with up-to-date maps arriving only towards the end.
Yitzhak, a reserve sniper, noted that the 100 or so soldiers in his unit were forced to take cover in only two houses of an abandoned village, which meant that a direct hit from a missile on one of the houses could have killed some 50 soldiers. The reason: "We only had two communication radios for the whole unit, and it was considered too dangerous to put soldiers in the village's other empty houses without a communication radio."
The soldiers had "red dot" sights for their rifles, Yitzhak said, but no equipment to fix the sights to the rifles. When they arrived at the base before going into Lebanon, there was such chaos in the weapons and ammunition warehouse that all the soldiers from the various units "just broke open the crates and took whatever they wanted, without signing for it. Lots of soldiers went into battle without enough ammunition," he said, noting that his unit was told to pack one pair of underpants and one pair of socks because they would be back in Israel after two days.
"We didn't get back for 10 days," Yitzhak noted.
SITTING ON the grass of the Rose Garden was "David," 27, a combat medic with the Alexandroni Brigade who had joined the reservists' march from Mevaseret Zion on Monday. "When we first got to the base and got our kitbags, a lot of us were missing basic things like combat vests and bullet-proof vests," he said, noting that he had no medic's vest and had to stuff his medical supplies wherever he could.
Unlike Yitzhak's and Lior's paratroopers units, the Alexandroni Brigade fought Hizbullah several times during the war. But because of the awful logistical conditions, the fighting was much harder than it should have been. "Our first mission was to reach a position that controlled the coastal road, and we reached it. But while it should have taken 36 hours, it took eight days," said David.
One reason was the lack of food and water. "We went as long as two-and-a-half days with daily rations of a can of tuna, a can of corn and a couple of pieces of bread - to share between four soldiers. So we got slowed up because 25 soldiers collapsed from dehydration and had to be evacuated. Everyone lost five, six, seven kilos in the 10 days we were there," he said.
Meir Pa'il, one of Israel's leading military historians, said this is the first time in all of Israel's wars that the reserve soldiers have complained to such a degree, and with such unanimity, about a comprehensive breakdown in practical IDF preparedness for battle. By contrast, he noted, the reservists' protests after the Yom Kippur War were over the failure to anticipate the Egyptian-Syrian attack, not over the lack of food and basic equipment.
"There are a lot of shlemiels in the army establishment," he said, while stressing that the failures of preparedness still didn't amount to a "total catastrophe" that by itself could spell defeat in war, because Israel's military strength can still make up for the oversights. He also noted that while such complaints aren't heard from the regular army, which stays prepared for battle on a daily basis, the reserves make up over 80% of the army ranks in war.
The Spearhead Brigade's petition speaks of a "crisis of confidence between us as fighters and the higher echelons," and both David and Lior gave personal testimony to this crisis. The "higher echelons" extends much deeper than just IDF chief Dan Halutz and the general staff.
"After we were released, the commander of our division spoke to us and said that while he would try to see that all these foul-ups didn't reappear the next time we had to go to battle, he couldn't promise that they wouldn't," said David. "The way he spoke to us was an insult to our intelligence, plain and simple. We have doctors, lawyers, company owners and government officials in our unit, and we leave our families and our jobs every year to serve our country, and he was talking to us like were were 18-year-olds.
"I've lost all faith in him," maintained David.
Lior said his immediate commanding officers told the unit that the kinds of demands they had, especially for equipment, were "small change," and that the IDF brass had much higher priorities for its budget, such as purchasing F-16 fighter jets.
"I still have faith in my company commander, my platoon commander, my brigade commander and even the division commander, but above them, the brigadier generals and up - I've lost my faith in them. If they can't understand the importance of taking care of the simple reserve soldier who drops everything to go wherever the army tells him, to risk his life, then I can't have faith in them anymore," he said.
These soldiers have fought the intifada for several years. They say they've never encountered such a comprehensive failure on the army's part.
"Some of the veterans in the unit were saying that this is the last reserve duty they'll ever pull, but I think I know them well enough to know that they'll be back next time we're called up," said Yitzhak. "But a lot of the guys in our unit this time were fresh out of the regular army - this was the first taste they've ever had of the reserves. After this, I wonder if they'll be ready to come back."
The reserve soldiers disagree on the goal of the protest; some say they won't leave the Rose Garden until the government agrees to a judicial inquiry committee into the handling of the war, some say they won't leave until Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Halutz resign, while others, like David, are waiting for some as-yet-unknown sign to convince them "that the leadership has heard what we have to say, is taking it to heart, and intends to learn the lessons of their failures."
By Monday evening, the number of reservists at the Rose Garden had grown from a handful to at least 200. Some had been released from duty that same day. And at this point, the protest appears to have traction; it is tapping in to overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the outcome of the war. The movement's assumption is that Israel could have won the war, but blew it. True or not, this is a widely-held view in this embittered nation. Which is why the protesters have the government and the IDF brass very worried.
Copyright 1995-2006 The Jerusalem Post
http://www.jpost.com/
People in the Tel Aviv area needing mental help to go to offices of Health Minister Yaacov Ben Yizri
Ichilov can't treat 3,000 new psychiatric patients, doctors say
By Ran Reznick
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
Some 3,000 new patients with psychiatric problems, among them 300 children and adolescents, and adults under compulsory commitment orders, will not receive the treatment they need at the government-municipal Ichilov Hospital at the Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, senior physicians believe.
Their concern comes in the wake of a directive issued last month by the Health Ministry, slashing by half the budget for psychiatric services at Ichilov Hospital, and a new directive by the hospital's deputy director, Dr. Ronni Gamzu, to greatly reduce mental treatment and not exceed the new quota set by the Health Ministry, "even if that entails stopping treatment immediately" and firing workers.
The ministry quota was part of its preparations for transfering responsibility for all psychiatric services to the four health management organizations (HMOs) in January 2007, in keeping with a government decision last February.
Staffers at Ichilov's psychiatric clinic posted an unusual notice on the door this past Sunday: "The Health Ministry has decided in a unilateral and arbitrary manner to limit the quota of patients at the clinic to half of the real treatment needs of the Tel Aviv public. Since in the first half of the year we have already far exceeded the new quota, we are regretfully compelled to close the clinic to new applicants until January 2007. Veteran patients will continue receiving treatment even though the existing service will also be limited."
The notice went on to state that people needing mental help, including urgent cases, can go to the HMOs, psychiatric hospitals and the offices of Health Minister Yaacov Ben Yizri and his director general, Prof. Avi Yisraeli.
A week ago, Prof. Gabriel Barbash, Ichilov's director general, wrote a sharp letter to Yisraeli, stating that the hospital management had tried to warn of the impending crisis and that responsibility for it resides with the ministry. Barbash added that "there is no suitable alternative framework in the Tel Aviv area," and asked: "Is it possible that nobody cares because in another three months the responsibility [for the psychiatric service] will perhaps move to another body?"
Two weeks ago, Dr. Shaul Schreiber, director of Ichilov's psychiatric service, warned Dr. Uzi Shai, the Health Ministry's district psychiatrist for Tel Aviv, but Shai responded yesterday with a particularly harsh letter, in which he warned Schreiber that Ichilov's moratorium on psychiatric services for new patients, "some of whom pose a danger to themselves and their environment, might exact a high price in human lives. The decision places some patients at risk and it is uncertain whether it would prove defensible in court in the event of disaster."
Shai expressed the hope that "the professional-ethical consideration will at least guide you to continue providing professional and responsible treatment to the residents as you have steadfastly done until now."
In a reply to Shai, Schreiber charged yesterday that some of his letter "lacks any substance, when the Health Ministry restricts the hospital to a treatment quota that does not cover even half the needs, and the hospital management issues dismissal letters for some of the workers. Had we acted out of a professional-ethical consideration, we would have shut down the system completely because we have far exceeded the patient quota for the entire year!"
The Health Ministry said yesterday that Ichilov's overflow patients can apply for now to other medical centers in Tel Aviv and the central region, and that Ichilov's concerns will be discussed by ministry officials in the coming days.
By Ran Reznick
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
Some 3,000 new patients with psychiatric problems, among them 300 children and adolescents, and adults under compulsory commitment orders, will not receive the treatment they need at the government-municipal Ichilov Hospital at the Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, senior physicians believe.
Their concern comes in the wake of a directive issued last month by the Health Ministry, slashing by half the budget for psychiatric services at Ichilov Hospital, and a new directive by the hospital's deputy director, Dr. Ronni Gamzu, to greatly reduce mental treatment and not exceed the new quota set by the Health Ministry, "even if that entails stopping treatment immediately" and firing workers.
The ministry quota was part of its preparations for transfering responsibility for all psychiatric services to the four health management organizations (HMOs) in January 2007, in keeping with a government decision last February.
Staffers at Ichilov's psychiatric clinic posted an unusual notice on the door this past Sunday: "The Health Ministry has decided in a unilateral and arbitrary manner to limit the quota of patients at the clinic to half of the real treatment needs of the Tel Aviv public. Since in the first half of the year we have already far exceeded the new quota, we are regretfully compelled to close the clinic to new applicants until January 2007. Veteran patients will continue receiving treatment even though the existing service will also be limited."
The notice went on to state that people needing mental help, including urgent cases, can go to the HMOs, psychiatric hospitals and the offices of Health Minister Yaacov Ben Yizri and his director general, Prof. Avi Yisraeli.
A week ago, Prof. Gabriel Barbash, Ichilov's director general, wrote a sharp letter to Yisraeli, stating that the hospital management had tried to warn of the impending crisis and that responsibility for it resides with the ministry. Barbash added that "there is no suitable alternative framework in the Tel Aviv area," and asked: "Is it possible that nobody cares because in another three months the responsibility [for the psychiatric service] will perhaps move to another body?"
Two weeks ago, Dr. Shaul Schreiber, director of Ichilov's psychiatric service, warned Dr. Uzi Shai, the Health Ministry's district psychiatrist for Tel Aviv, but Shai responded yesterday with a particularly harsh letter, in which he warned Schreiber that Ichilov's moratorium on psychiatric services for new patients, "some of whom pose a danger to themselves and their environment, might exact a high price in human lives. The decision places some patients at risk and it is uncertain whether it would prove defensible in court in the event of disaster."
Shai expressed the hope that "the professional-ethical consideration will at least guide you to continue providing professional and responsible treatment to the residents as you have steadfastly done until now."
In a reply to Shai, Schreiber charged yesterday that some of his letter "lacks any substance, when the Health Ministry restricts the hospital to a treatment quota that does not cover even half the needs, and the hospital management issues dismissal letters for some of the workers. Had we acted out of a professional-ethical consideration, we would have shut down the system completely because we have far exceeded the patient quota for the entire year!"
The Health Ministry said yesterday that Ichilov's overflow patients can apply for now to other medical centers in Tel Aviv and the central region, and that Ichilov's concerns will be discussed by ministry officials in the coming days.
Army not prepared for sudden shift from normalcy to war
The Lessons of War / The IDF had been warned
By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz Correspondent
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
During meetings at the General Staff this week, in which the Israel Defense Forces preparations for war were at the center of discussions, the participants were shocked to discover that in a March 2006 report of the defense establishment's comptroller, the army was found not to be prepared to carry out the sudden shift from normalcy to war and that its "operational plans were not up to date."
Much to the surprise of the chief of staff, his deputy and other senior generals, this had been the conclusion in the comptroller's report during the previous year as well. In the report the comptroller had demanded that the situation be immediately remedied. It also turns out that teams of the comptroller's office continued their work, in the field, during the last war.
Also invited to the meeting at the General Staff was the defense establishment's comptroller, Brigadier-General (ret.) Yosef Beinhorn. Beinhorn formerly served as the chief of then defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer staff. The appointment of comptroller of the defense establishment is authorized by the government. Every year the comptroller prepares an annual report, similar to the reports of the state comptroller.
These reports do not enjoy great publicity. The reports are presented to the defense minister, the chief of staff and the various auditing sections of the IDF. Those being audited must prepare a detailed response on how the shortcomings noted in the report have been corrected.
The comptroller's 2005 report, which was published in March 2006, was on the agenda of the meeting at the General Staff. Also mentioned was the previous report, of 2004, which was published in the spring of 2005. In the report issued in 2006 there are two very grave criticisms. The first concludes that "most of the operational plans of the IDF have not been updated for a number of years." On this matter it was written that the lack of updating can be temporary but that this is not always the case. It does not specify one of the IDF's geographic commands, such as the Northern Command.
The negative conclusion relates to the overall structure. Accompanying this serious criticism is a demand, in a warning tone, that "a clear plan and time-table for bridging the gaps is necessary."
The second grave conclusion in the comptroller's report relates to the IDF's "preparedness" in terms of its emergency depots, in the stores, equipment and ammunition. This is what was found to be a problem on July 12, when Hezbollah attacked and Israel decided to respond in a broad and massive offensive. The report says that it is particularly important to examine the preparedness to shift suddenly "from the routine to a state of emergency," and that the problems that were found constitute a source of weakness. Again, this is what suddenly emerged when war broke out. It should be noted that the report also raises problems in battlefield intelligence.
This is a fascinating report in terms of its conclusions and its foresight. The two committees that are supposed to examine what happened to the IDF, that ordered by the government and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and that set up by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, should take a close look at the material in these reports.
By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz Correspondent
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
During meetings at the General Staff this week, in which the Israel Defense Forces preparations for war were at the center of discussions, the participants were shocked to discover that in a March 2006 report of the defense establishment's comptroller, the army was found not to be prepared to carry out the sudden shift from normalcy to war and that its "operational plans were not up to date."
Much to the surprise of the chief of staff, his deputy and other senior generals, this had been the conclusion in the comptroller's report during the previous year as well. In the report the comptroller had demanded that the situation be immediately remedied. It also turns out that teams of the comptroller's office continued their work, in the field, during the last war.
Also invited to the meeting at the General Staff was the defense establishment's comptroller, Brigadier-General (ret.) Yosef Beinhorn. Beinhorn formerly served as the chief of then defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer staff. The appointment of comptroller of the defense establishment is authorized by the government. Every year the comptroller prepares an annual report, similar to the reports of the state comptroller.
These reports do not enjoy great publicity. The reports are presented to the defense minister, the chief of staff and the various auditing sections of the IDF. Those being audited must prepare a detailed response on how the shortcomings noted in the report have been corrected.
The comptroller's 2005 report, which was published in March 2006, was on the agenda of the meeting at the General Staff. Also mentioned was the previous report, of 2004, which was published in the spring of 2005. In the report issued in 2006 there are two very grave criticisms. The first concludes that "most of the operational plans of the IDF have not been updated for a number of years." On this matter it was written that the lack of updating can be temporary but that this is not always the case. It does not specify one of the IDF's geographic commands, such as the Northern Command.
The negative conclusion relates to the overall structure. Accompanying this serious criticism is a demand, in a warning tone, that "a clear plan and time-table for bridging the gaps is necessary."
The second grave conclusion in the comptroller's report relates to the IDF's "preparedness" in terms of its emergency depots, in the stores, equipment and ammunition. This is what was found to be a problem on July 12, when Hezbollah attacked and Israel decided to respond in a broad and massive offensive. The report says that it is particularly important to examine the preparedness to shift suddenly "from the routine to a state of emergency," and that the problems that were found constitute a source of weakness. Again, this is what suddenly emerged when war broke out. It should be noted that the report also raises problems in battlefield intelligence.
This is a fascinating report in terms of its conclusions and its foresight. The two committees that are supposed to examine what happened to the IDF, that ordered by the government and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and that set up by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, should take a close look at the material in these reports.
Wednesday, August 30, 2006
In the land of Chelm, quis custodiet ipsos custodies?
PMO 'astounded' by comptroller criticism over probe plan
By Yoav Stern, Ruth Sinai and Mazal Mualem, Haaretz Correspondents
Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30, 2006
By Yoav Stern, Ruth Sinai and Mazal Mualem, Haaretz Correspondents
Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30, 2006
The Prime Minister's Office said Tuesday that it was "astounded" to hear of complaints by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss over a plan for him to investigate the wartime readiness of Israel's home front.
The PMO added that the law explicitly states that the State Comptroller is bound to write an opinion when requested to do so by the cabinet.
Lindenstrauss earlier Tuesday reprimanded Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for having announced that the government would ask him to carry out the investigation, saying that the proposal was against the law and would compromise the independence of the Comptroller's office.
The exchange also followed a flap in which senior officials in the Labor Party, the key partner in Ehud Olmert's coalition government, openly expressed opposition to Olmert's announced intention to appoint a number of investigative committees rather than a full state inquiry into the conduct of the war.
Olmert decided that the issue of the preparedness of the home front would not be included within the brief of the governmental panel of inquiry, and asked that the investigation be handled by the Comptroller.
Lindenstrauss issued a statement Tuesday saying that under the law, only the Comptroller and his office were authorized to decide on the investigations they undertake. It was important that the cabinet be scrupulous regarding the independence of the Comptroller's office, the statement said.
The Prime Minister's Office responded that it was "astounded to hear from the media of the Comptroller's complaints."
The PMO cited a clause of the Comptroller's Law stating that "the Comptroller is obligated to the prepare a ruling on every issue within his purview, whether asked to do so by the Knesset or by the Cabinet."
Labor ministers oppose inquiry plan
Two Labor cabinet ministers said late on Monday that they would vote against the prime minister's decision.
Olmert decided Monday to set up two committees of inquiry into the government's and military's handling of the war, rejecting both the option of a more comprehensive, independent state commission of inquiry and a government commission of inquiry.
A third panel, yet to be appointed, will look into the Israel Defense Forces' and the defense establishment's functioning during the war.
The criticism within Labor was led by ministers Ophir Pines-Paz and Eitan Cabel, who announced that they would vote against the commission outlined by Olmert and said they would try to persuade other ministers to do the same. The Labor Party chairman, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, declined Monday to comment on Olmert's decision.
Pines-Paz called for a state commission, calling it the right way and the only way, to investigate the war. "I intend to oppose [Olmert's decision] in the government, and will try to convince other ministers," he said. "The commission Olmert has appointed to investigate the political echelons does not have clear authority or a timetable, and increasing the number of commissions of inquiries will lead to chaos."
Olmert associates, however, believe that the prime minister has a comfortable majority within the government who are in favor of his proposal, even if Labor ministers vote against.
"We don't have the luxury to spend years examining the past. What we need is a businesslike, professional investigation that gets to the root of the problem quickly," Olmert said in a speech in Haifa on Monday night, addressing leaders of communities damaged by Hezbollah rocket fire.
He also said he did not want to subject the army to "collective flagellation."
Sources close to the prime minister told Haaretz that the Shin Bet security service and Mossad had advised Olmert not to establish a state commission of inquiry into the war.
"The committee will be charged with examining the government's functioning and decision-making as it sees fit," Olmert said.
The inquiry into the government's conduct and functioning during the war will be headed by former Mossad intelligence service chief Nahum Admoni.
Law Professor Ruth Gavison, Professor Yehezkel Dror and Brigadier General (res.) Yedidya Yaari will also serve on the panel.
Olmert emphasized that the decision to go to war had been his alone, and said he was responsible for the war's results. "I want to make one thing clear, the responsibility for the decision to go to war... is entirely mine," the prime minister said.
Neither of the two committees named on Monday has the legal authority to summon witnesses.
The powers of the panels fall short of the demands for an independent, in-depth probe with the authority to dismiss top government officials.
Olmert's decision is likely to further enrage critics, who say that the prime minister and other top officials should be the focus of the investigation and not its overseer.
Critics have been demanding a full-blown state commission of inquiry that has the authority to dismiss officials. Israel has carried out such inquiries after past crises - including the 1982 Lebanon War - that led to the dismissal of then defense minister Ariel Sharon.
The examination of how the bombarded home front was handled will not be under the jurisdiction of either commission, and will be left up to the State Comptroller to investigate.
In his speech, Olmert justified the war, saying Israel inflicted heavy damage on Hezbollah. He described the cease-fire, which calls for a beefed-up international force to help police the border, as a major diplomatic success.
He also said the ground offensive, launched just as the cease-fire agreement was taking form, was "unavoidable," despite the heavy Israeli casualties. He said the offensive put pressure on the United Nations to approve the cease-fire.
Former MK Professor Amnon Rubinstein was offered the chairmanship of the committee of inquiry into the conduct of the government, but he turned it down.
The committee of inquiry into the functioning of the military during the war will apparently be based on the panel appointed by Defense Minister Amir Peretz and headed by former IDF chief of staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak.
The panel suspended its work after one day due to public criticism.
The Inquiries / Exposing the past for the future
Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30,2006
Once the decision has been taken to investigate the war, everything must be
done to ensure that the inquiries that have been established do a thorough and courageous job.
The goal of these inquiries is not to chop off heads or to settle accounts between politicians, but to expose the truth and the shortcomings and, whenever necessary, to expose those responsible. Israel will no doubt have to share some the conclusions with friendly democracies, since the war was part of a developing global conflict and not merely a localized incident.
It was clear all along that not everyone would be satisfied with whatever type of inquiry it was decided to establish.
Now that the decision has been taken, it is vital for the inquiries to work quickly and that the collation of testimony does not interfere with the IDF's operational investigations. These, too, are needed to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.
Dividing the probe into two inquiries, political and military, is not possible on every issue. One can separate the military-tactical issue from the political and strategic issue, but there is no way of avoiding overlap and duplication when it comes to discussing the major political-military issues or strategic intelligence. That is why an issue of such major significance as the relationship between the political and military leadership cannot be overlooked.
The issue of the readiness of the home front, which has been entrusted to State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss, also has elements that are linked to decisions taken by the prime minister and defense minister.
As part of the work, the inquiries must address issues that include:
-The military advances made by Hezbollah in recent years, and Israel's response to this.
-The dialog between the militAry and political leadership with regards to threats to Israel since the establishment of the Olmert government and the appointment of Amir Peretz as defense minister.
-Whether Israel decided on July 12, after two soldiers were kidnapped and their comrades were killed, to launch a comprehensive military response against Hezbollah and Lebanon, up to and including all-out war.
-The level of IDF readiness for war with Hezbollah; the Northern Command's operational plans.
-Whether IDF's top officers knew about the state of the emergency supplies, which had been half depleted as a result of operation in the West Bank.
Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30,2006
Once the decision has been taken to investigate the war, everything must be
done to ensure that the inquiries that have been established do a thorough and courageous job.
The goal of these inquiries is not to chop off heads or to settle accounts between politicians, but to expose the truth and the shortcomings and, whenever necessary, to expose those responsible. Israel will no doubt have to share some the conclusions with friendly democracies, since the war was part of a developing global conflict and not merely a localized incident.
It was clear all along that not everyone would be satisfied with whatever type of inquiry it was decided to establish.
Now that the decision has been taken, it is vital for the inquiries to work quickly and that the collation of testimony does not interfere with the IDF's operational investigations. These, too, are needed to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.
Dividing the probe into two inquiries, political and military, is not possible on every issue. One can separate the military-tactical issue from the political and strategic issue, but there is no way of avoiding overlap and duplication when it comes to discussing the major political-military issues or strategic intelligence. That is why an issue of such major significance as the relationship between the political and military leadership cannot be overlooked.
The issue of the readiness of the home front, which has been entrusted to State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss, also has elements that are linked to decisions taken by the prime minister and defense minister.
As part of the work, the inquiries must address issues that include:
-The military advances made by Hezbollah in recent years, and Israel's response to this.
-The dialog between the militAry and political leadership with regards to threats to Israel since the establishment of the Olmert government and the appointment of Amir Peretz as defense minister.
-Whether Israel decided on July 12, after two soldiers were kidnapped and their comrades were killed, to launch a comprehensive military response against Hezbollah and Lebanon, up to and including all-out war.
-The level of IDF readiness for war with Hezbollah; the Northern Command's operational plans.
-Whether IDF's top officers knew about the state of the emergency supplies, which had been half depleted as a result of operation in the West Bank.
Yossi Sarid - disgrace has a way of haunting those who try to avoid it
Olmert's Speech / Third-rate panels, first-rate snafu
Yossi Sarid, Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30, 2006
It was difficult to find even one sentence in the prime minister's speech last night that could not be immediately refuted. Ehud Olmert should have taken his cue from Hassan Nasrallah and admitted that he had misjudged the start of the conflict. Instead, he exchanged places with him, and made typical Nasrallah comments. How the tables have turned: Olmert bragged before going to war, and keeps on boasting after it.
He did not fulfill his duty as prime minister yesterday, and tried to pay lip service. Fleeing helter skelter from responsibility, he is trying to prevent the establishment of a state commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice, and to artificially resuscitate a governmental commission of inquiry headed by a Mossad chief from way back when.
But disgrace has a way of haunting those who try to avoid it. The specter of a state commission of inquiry will haunt Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz day and night, and terrify them.
Olmert's main argument against setting up a commission of inquiry worthy of the name was that he refuses to plunge the chief of staff and the country into an exhausting maelstrom that could go on for years.
In the same breath, he announced three simultaneous inquiries that will force the characters involved to scurry back and forth - because in this war, it is impossible to distinguish between the front and home front, and between the politicians and civilians. After all, any panel wishing to do its job properly will have to listen to all the versions to get the complete picture.
I feel for all those who made the mistake of accepting their appointment to this task. They have violated the public's trust even before their first meeting. The public was hoping to be informed of the truth and has been given a fig leaf instead. The appointed members may have good intentions, but the one who appointed doesn't. If these committees do complete their task, they themselves will have to be investigated one day.
Most of the members have neither the means nor the qualifications to conduct a real inquiry. They were chosen by default when their betters declined to collude in an escape strategy for the cabinet and General Staff. These are third-rate committees for a first-rate foul up.
Yossi Sarid, Ha'aretz, Wednesday, August 30, 2006
It was difficult to find even one sentence in the prime minister's speech last night that could not be immediately refuted. Ehud Olmert should have taken his cue from Hassan Nasrallah and admitted that he had misjudged the start of the conflict. Instead, he exchanged places with him, and made typical Nasrallah comments. How the tables have turned: Olmert bragged before going to war, and keeps on boasting after it.
He did not fulfill his duty as prime minister yesterday, and tried to pay lip service. Fleeing helter skelter from responsibility, he is trying to prevent the establishment of a state commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice, and to artificially resuscitate a governmental commission of inquiry headed by a Mossad chief from way back when.
But disgrace has a way of haunting those who try to avoid it. The specter of a state commission of inquiry will haunt Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz day and night, and terrify them.
Olmert's main argument against setting up a commission of inquiry worthy of the name was that he refuses to plunge the chief of staff and the country into an exhausting maelstrom that could go on for years.
In the same breath, he announced three simultaneous inquiries that will force the characters involved to scurry back and forth - because in this war, it is impossible to distinguish between the front and home front, and between the politicians and civilians. After all, any panel wishing to do its job properly will have to listen to all the versions to get the complete picture.
I feel for all those who made the mistake of accepting their appointment to this task. They have violated the public's trust even before their first meeting. The public was hoping to be informed of the truth and has been given a fig leaf instead. The appointed members may have good intentions, but the one who appointed doesn't. If these committees do complete their task, they themselves will have to be investigated one day.
Most of the members have neither the means nor the qualifications to conduct a real inquiry. They were chosen by default when their betters declined to collude in an escape strategy for the cabinet and General Staff. These are third-rate committees for a first-rate foul up.
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