The Lessons of War / The IDF had been warned
By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz Correspondent
Ha'aretz, Thursday, August 31, 2006
During meetings at the General Staff this week, in which the Israel Defense Forces preparations for war were at the center of discussions, the participants were shocked to discover that in a March 2006 report of the defense establishment's comptroller, the army was found not to be prepared to carry out the sudden shift from normalcy to war and that its "operational plans were not up to date."
Much to the surprise of the chief of staff, his deputy and other senior generals, this had been the conclusion in the comptroller's report during the previous year as well. In the report the comptroller had demanded that the situation be immediately remedied. It also turns out that teams of the comptroller's office continued their work, in the field, during the last war.
Also invited to the meeting at the General Staff was the defense establishment's comptroller, Brigadier-General (ret.) Yosef Beinhorn. Beinhorn formerly served as the chief of then defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer staff. The appointment of comptroller of the defense establishment is authorized by the government. Every year the comptroller prepares an annual report, similar to the reports of the state comptroller.
These reports do not enjoy great publicity. The reports are presented to the defense minister, the chief of staff and the various auditing sections of the IDF. Those being audited must prepare a detailed response on how the shortcomings noted in the report have been corrected.
The comptroller's 2005 report, which was published in March 2006, was on the agenda of the meeting at the General Staff. Also mentioned was the previous report, of 2004, which was published in the spring of 2005. In the report issued in 2006 there are two very grave criticisms. The first concludes that "most of the operational plans of the IDF have not been updated for a number of years." On this matter it was written that the lack of updating can be temporary but that this is not always the case. It does not specify one of the IDF's geographic commands, such as the Northern Command.
The negative conclusion relates to the overall structure. Accompanying this serious criticism is a demand, in a warning tone, that "a clear plan and time-table for bridging the gaps is necessary."
The second grave conclusion in the comptroller's report relates to the IDF's "preparedness" in terms of its emergency depots, in the stores, equipment and ammunition. This is what was found to be a problem on July 12, when Hezbollah attacked and Israel decided to respond in a broad and massive offensive. The report says that it is particularly important to examine the preparedness to shift suddenly "from the routine to a state of emergency," and that the problems that were found constitute a source of weakness. Again, this is what suddenly emerged when war broke out. It should be noted that the report also raises problems in battlefield intelligence.
This is a fascinating report in terms of its conclusions and its foresight. The two committees that are supposed to examine what happened to the IDF, that ordered by the government and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and that set up by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, and headed by former Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, should take a close look at the material in these reports.
